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TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’: WHEN TECH EMPLOYEES
REVOLT!
ANAT ALON-BECK*
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic sparked social distancing, economic crisis,
mass layoffs, furloughs, inequality, and civil unrest. Corporate responses to
the pandemic have profound effects on employee rights, employees’ role in
the corporations that they serve, and overall economic activity in the United
States. In the last few decades, corporate governance scholarship neglected
the role of employees—“human capital”—and mainly focused on the
relationship between directors, managers, and shareholders. There are calls
from the public for a revolution in corporate law in the United States,
mirroring the current social movements that oppose shareholder wealth
maximization, to resist short-termism and achieve long-term value.
Corporations are being pressured by institutional investors to incorporate a
deep obligation to act for the benefit of society at large in their charters, and
to include employees formally, as stakeholders, in the governance of
corporations. Tech employees joined these calls and are revolting by
organizing, striking, and publicly speaking out against their employers. Tech
employees demand that their employers redefine corporate purpose and
pursue long-term value while using a stakeholder lens. These developments
contribute to a “paradigm shift” in thinking about talent management and
corporate culture. In 2020, companies finally realized that “shareholder

© 2020 Anat Alon-Beck.
*Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank Michal
Agmon-Gonnen, Constance Bagley, Lucian Bebchuk, Christopher Bruner, Karen Chesley, Patrick
Corrigan, Jens Christian Dammann, Charles Elson, Yuliya Guseva, Assaf Hamdani, Sharona
Hoffman, Marcel Kahan, Kobi Kastiel, Charles Korsmo, Juliet Kostritsky, Ann Lipton, Martin
Lipton, John Livingston, Geeyoung Min, Demari Muff, Robert Rapp, Gabriel Rauterberg, Asaf Raz,
Cassandra Roberston, Edward Rock, Darren Rosenblum, Helen Scott, Omari Scott Simmons, Verity
Winship, and Emily Winston. A special thank you to William J. Moon for inviting me to participate
in the Maryland Law Review’s symposium program on Delaware’s Emerging Competition and the
Future of American Corporate Law, and to Brandon Wharton and the amazing law review
editors for all of their hard work in editing my submission. I want to dedicate this piece to my
amazing mentors, Karen Brenner, Deborah Burand, Edward Rock, Gerald Rosenfeld, Helen Scott
and Lynn Stout, who greatly influenced my world views. I hope that my research will inspire the
new generation of law students, entrepreneurs, corporations, shareholders and other stakeholders to
work together to achieve long-term value and to one day incorporate in their charters a deep
obligation to act for the benefit of society at large.

120

2020]

TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’

121

primacy” is not a good business strategy for attracting, engaging, and
retaining their workforce.
This Article will address the old but ongoing debate in corporate
governance theory, from the current dominant shareholder-centric corporate
governance to collaborative (stakeholder-centric) corporate governance,
and the new corporate personhood theory. It answers the question of
whether our corporate law allows directors to take stakeholder interests into
account. It offers a pragmatic solution to the age-old debate on whether
corporate law allows directors to take stakeholder interests into account by
arguing that our corporate governance theory can be extended to include the
protection of directors (or officers) if they take employee interests into
account in decision-making. However, this Article also argues that if public
companies decide to take stakeholder interests into account, then they should
formally change their charters (or certificates of incorporation). Moreover,
and more importantly, they should be required to disclose additional
information and file periodically with the relevant state and federal
authorities, akin to Public Benefit Corporations (“PBCs”). Public
companies must disclose information on their various efforts to promote their
public benefit mission and purpose—and the results of such efforts—to their
shareholders and the public. Different states have different reporting
requirements for PBCs, which these companies can easily follow. There is
new legislation that was recently passed by the Delaware House of
Representatives that makes it easier for a traditional corporation to convert
to a PBC. With regard to federal authorities, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should move to a prescriptive approach (a
specific line-item requirement) and require public companies to disclose
information on talent management. The SEC must further develop agreedupon metrics in order to assess these efforts and the reports on performance
results.
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American workers are more educated than ever, more skilled, and
doing more to create corporate profits than ever, but they have
shared far less in the fruits of that labor. To help redress this
problem, workers must be given more voice within the corporate
boardroom, and top managers and directors must give greater
thought to how they treat their employees. Companies should have
board-level committees that ensure quality wages and fair worker
treatment.
Leo Strine1
[D]isclosure would lead firms to increase human capital
investment, it should help raise workers’ wages and benefit the
economy overall.
Center for American Progress2
I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic is disrupting our way of life and highlighting
the structural inequalities in our society. Corporate responses to the
pandemic have profound effects on employee rights, employees’ role in the
corporations that they serve, and overall economic activity in the United
States. In the last few decades, corporate governance scholarship neglected
the role of employees—”human capital”—and mainly focused on the
relationship between directors, managers, and shareholders. Employees
around the country are directly affected by the pandemic and millions have
experienced financial instability, furloughs, and layoffs. The research,
statistics, and literature on the impacts of COVID-19 on the U.S. labor market
are evolving rapidly. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of mid1. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal to
Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and Shareholders, and
Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward
Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging Investments in America’s Future 2 (Univ. of Pa.,
Inst.
for
L.
&
Econ.,
Rsch.
Paper
No.
19-39,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924.
2. ANGELA HANKS, ETHAN GURWITZ, BRENDAN V. DUKE & ANDY GREEN, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, WORKERS OR WASTE? HOW COMPANIES DISCLOSE—OR DO NOT DISCLOSE— HUMAN
CAPITAL
INVESTMENTS
AND
WHAT
TO
DO
ABOUT
IT
2
(2016),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03042031/HumanCapital.pdf.
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April 2020, the unemployment rate stands at 14.7% (some studies suggest a
higher number closer to 20%),3 and more than 36 million U.S. workers have
filed for unemployment benefits.4
Despite the fact that unemployment has hit an all-time high in many
countries across the globe, including the United States, large firms, especially
ones in the tech industry, are finding that the talent that they need to grow,
compete, and survive is in short supply.5 In the new “knowledge economy,”6
companies depend on their talent—employees—to provide the human capital
that helps the firm grow and compete in this dynamic, complex, and
everchanging world. There is a shortage in skilled labor that contributes to a
“war for talent”7 where large companies, especially tech companies,
aggressively compete for talent. As repeat players in competitive markets,
these companies must establish and maintain a credible reputation in order to
attract, engage, and retain talent. Companies that cannot attract, engage, or
retain talent will not be able to grow and compete.
All businesses, including tech businesses, have to navigate the
unprecedented hardships from the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in a

3. See Laura Montenovo, Xuan Jiang, Felipe Lozano Rojas, Ian M. Schmutte, Kosali I. Simon,
Bruce A. Weinberg & Coady Wing, Determinants of Disparities in COVID-19 Job Losses 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27132, 2020). Note that the number can be as much as
20% according to Shahar Ziv. Id. (“The fraction of workers who report that they were ‘employed
but absent’ from work during the CPS reference week grew from 2.5% in February to 7.3% in April.
If these absent workers are actually unemployed, then the unemployment rate might be closer to
20%.”).
4. Id.
5. ERNST & YOUNG, PARADIGM SHIFT: BUILDING A NEW TALENT MANAGEMENT MODEL TO
BOOST GROWTH 5 (2012), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-paradigmshift/$FILE/EY-paradigm-shift.pdf (“The scarcity of talent is quickly turning out to be the single
biggest obstacle to growth. Globally, companies are having trouble filling critical positions – roles
in which they need people with the advanced skills essential to move the business forward.”).
6. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2019). Also, Powell
and Snellman define the knowledge economy as “production and services based on knowledgeintensive activities that contribute to an accelerated pace of technological and scientific advance as
well as equally rapid obsolescence. The key components of a knowledge economy include a greater
reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical inputs or natural resources . . . . ” Walter W.
Powell & Kaisa Snellman, The Knowledge Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 199, 201 (2004),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kaisa/files/powell_snellman.pdf.
7. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Anat Alon-Beck, INSIGHT: When
Unicorn Employees Revolt and Push for IPO, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2019, 4:01 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/insight-when-unicorn-employees-revolt-and-pushfor-ipo; Anat Alon-Beck, The Unicorn War for Talent: The Employees Fire Back. WeWork Is the
Latest
Example.,
FORBES
(Jan.
29,
2020,
12:12
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/01/29/the-unicorn-war-for-talent-the-employeesfire-back-wework-is-the-latest-example/#1f178def35da; Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock
Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 23,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/23/unicorn-stock-options-golden-goose-or-trojanhorse/.
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global health and financial crisis. International organizations8 and global
institutional investors,9 which comprise public pensions, asset management
firms, and faith-based funds, are calling on the business community to
respond to the pandemic responsibly by taking stakeholder interests into
account when making decisions that affect employees, communities, and the
markets.10 Tech employees are joining these calls by revolting and
demanding that their employers step up to the plate, redefine corporate
purpose, and pursue long-term value while using a stakeholder lens. They
want their employers to take into account multiple factors—including healthcare, political, and socio-economic factors—when making business decisions
that can affect not only their rights but the rights of other stakeholders.11
There are many examples of companies, such as Facebook, Amazon, Google,
Salesforce, and Microsoft, that take employee badmouthing and public
complaints very seriously.12 They do so because such behavior can cause not
only a reputational damage to the firm, but also higher costs of monitoring
the labor force.13
Tech employee activism is not a new phenomenon and has been taking
place in the past few years. There are many examples of tech employees, as
discussed in further detail below, who are putting pressure on decision
8. See UNITED NATIONS, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, GLOBAL SOLIDARITY: RESPONDING TO
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
IMPACTS
OF
COVID-19
7
(2020),
https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/SG-Report-Socio-Economic-Impact-ofCovid19.pdf (“The United Nations calls on all businesses and corporations to take three primary
actions: a. Adhere to health, safety guidelines and provide economic cushions to workers, including
through ensuring worker safety and social distancing and secure wages for those working from
home. b. Provide financial and technical support to governments by contributing to the COVID-19
Solidarity Response Fund. c. Repurpose their facilities and business plans to focus on meeting the
needs of this crisis. Some have begun to do so; we need many more to follow in suit.”) (emphasis
omitted).
9. The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility’s Investor Statement on Coronavirus
Response was supported by 251 long-term institutional investors representing over $6.4 trillion in
assets under management with global exposure across capital markets. INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP.
RESP.,
INVESTOR
STATEMENT
ON
CORONAVIRUS
RESPONSE
(2020),
https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/page_attachments/investor_statement_on_coronavirus_res
ponse_04.02.2020.pdf.
10. See id.; see also Investors Call on Companies to do Their Part to Support Workers and
Markets During the Coronavirus Crisis, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESP. (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.iccr.org/investors-call-companies-do-their-part-support-workers-and-markets-duringcoronavirus-crisis.
11. See, e.g., April Glaser, Kickstarter Workers Vote to Form First Union in Tech Industry,
NBC News (Feb. 18, 2020, 11:07 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/kickstarterworkers-vote-form-first-union-tech-industry-n1138006; Becca Blazak, The Move Towards
Stakeholder
Capitalism,
TechEquity
Collaborative
(Apr.
30,
2020),
https://techequitycollaborative.org/2020/04/30/the-move-towards-stakeholder-capitalism/.
12. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
13. Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse, 2019 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 107, 118 (2019).
THE
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makers in their firms to enhance social, environmental, and economic values,
and to use innovative decision-making methods.14 This recent surge in
activism, with an embedded social purpose and value creation, is often a
direct result of a market, government, or even philanthropic organizations’
failure to respond to and alleviate social problems.15 Academics, business
leaders, policymakers, and legislators are grappling with how to respond to
this relatively new phenomenon. The shortage in skilled labor and the recent
public reports on tech employee uprisings are contributing to a “paradigm
shift”16 in thinking about the purpose of corporate law, talent management,
and corporate culture. In 2020, companies finally realized that “shareholder
primacy” is not a good business strategy for attracting, engaging, and
retaining their workforce.17
This Article will address the old but ongoing debate in corporate
governance theory, from the current dominant shareholder-centric corporate
governance model, to collaborative (stakeholder-centric) corporate
governance and the new corporate personhood theory.18 It answers the
14. Allison Bailey, Vikram Bhalla, Rainer Strack, Diana Dosik & Judy Oh, Organizing for the
Future with Tech, Talent, and Purpose: Winning the ‘20s, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (Sept. 16, 2019)
(“The workforce is changing as well. Millennials and Generation Z employees are on track to make
up 59% of the workforce by 2020, according to Manpower Group. These employees have different
expectations about engagement and working models—our research shows that 67% of millennials
expect employers to have purpose and their jobs to have societal impact, and a Gallup study suggests
that, by 2028, 73% of all teams will have remote workers.”).
15. Noam Scheiber & Kate Conger, The Great Google Revolt, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 18,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/18/magazine/google-revolt.html;
Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, “Cubicle Activism”: Companies Face Growing Demands from
Workers to Cut Ties with ICE and Others in Immigration Arena, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.: POL’Y
BEAT (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cubicle-activism-companies-faceworker-demands-cut-ties-ice; Kate Mackenzie, Employee Activism Works—Even When It Doesn’t,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0226/employee-activism-works-even-when-it-doesn-t.
16. ERNST & YOUNG, HOW AND WHY HUMAN CAPITAL DISCLOSURES ARE EVOLVING 1
(2019),
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/cbm/ey-how-and-whyhuman-capital-disclosures-are-evolving.pdf; Steve Klemash, Bridget M. Neill & Jamie C. Smith,
How and Why Human Capital Disclosures Are Evolving, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/15/how-and-why-human-capitaldisclosures-are-evolving/.
17. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION (2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporationOctober2020.pdf
[hereinafter STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION]; Maggie Fitzgerald, The CEOs of
Nearly 200 Companies Just Said Shareholder Value Is No Longer Their Main Objective, CNBC
(Aug. 19, 2019, 7:38 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/19/the-ceos-of-nearly-two-hundredcompanies-say-shareholder-value-is-no-longer-their-main-objective.html;
Michael
Birshan,
Madeleine Goerg, Anna Moore & Ellora-Julie Parekh, Investors Remind Business Leaders:
Governance Matters, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/investors-remind-business-leadersgovernance-matters.
18. See infra Part IV.

126

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:120

question of whether our corporate law allows directors to takes stakeholder
interests into account. This debate is relevant today as the pandemic shines
a light on a new movement in corporate law, which calls on companies and
institutional investors to adopt a new theory of the purpose of the corporation.
Amongst the movement’s notable spokespeople are Martin Lipton, Colin
Mayer, and Alex Edmans. 19
Lipton is a leading American lawyer, who founded the law firm of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and who advocates for companies, asset
managers, and investors to embrace the principles of his new corporate
governance framework, The New Paradigm, which takes stakeholder
interests into account to achieve long-term value and resist short-termism.20
Mayer is an Oxford Professor who is collaborating with the British
Academy’s Future of the Corporation Project, and urges for a more radical
reform. In his recent book, Prosperity: Better Business Makes the Greater
Good, Mayer proposes a new theory of the purpose of business: “[t]he
purpose of business is to produce profitable solutions to the problems of
people and planet, and in the process it produces profits.”21 Edmans is a
Professor of Business at Gresham College and Professor of Finance at
London Business School. He offers a new financial theory “pieconomics” in
his book Grow the Pie, which shows that “the most successful companies
don’t target profit directly but are driven by purpose—the desire to serve a
societal need and contribute to human betterment.”22
The Article will introduce this new literature with an emphasis on
employees as stakeholders. In the last few decades, U.S. corporate
governance scholarship neglected the role of employees—“human capital”—
and mainly focused on the relationship between directors, managers, and
shareholders. Employees outside the United States have a formal role in
corporate governance. In the United States, on the other hand, there is an
increase in shareholder activism and a decline in worker power (in the form
of decreased bargaining power). This Article will contribute to the literature
by building on the work of Edward Rock and Lynn Stout.
The focus on corporate governance due to economic crisis is not new.
Following the 2008 instability and economic crisis, which was caused by
abuses of large corporations, there was a renewed interest in the corporate
governance practices of modern corporations and the oversight duties of

19. See infra Part IV.
20. Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-thenew-paradigm/.
21. COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 39 (2018).
22. ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND
PROFIT 1 (2020).
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institutional investors.23 Many countries around the world changed their
corporate governance codes to take stakeholder interests into account.24
Unfortunately, in the United States, the change is mostly rhetorical.
United States business leaders, who are subject to mounting pressures from
employees and institutional investors, recently adopted the controversial
Business Roundtable Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, and even
included investing in employees as a priority.25 However, as correctly
pointed out by Harvard Professor Lucian Bebchuck, many of the signatories
were probably using the statement for public relations purposes (“social
washing”) without taking any drastic steps to implement their own
suggestions.26 Despite the statement, the traditional “shareholder primacy”
view is still very dominant in the United States, as explained in further detail
below.
Consequently, twelve years after the last crisis, a slightly different
question needs to be raised: Do we need to make legal changes to allow firms
to commit to their employees (stakeholders)? The question here is not
whether corporate law mandates concern for stakeholders but rather whether
it permits it. As noted, there have been calls by academics, business leaders,
politicians, and workers for firms to take stakeholder interests into account.27
23. See Kent Greenfield, The Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 749, 749 (2014) (“This
moment has been engendered because of the increasing skepticism the public is showing toward
corporations and the people who manage them. The skepticism springs from shocks in the economic
and political fields that revealed the risks of unbridled corporate power, short-termism, managerial
opportunism, and shareholder (read Wall Street) supremacy.”).
24. See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose? 101–
02
(Inst.
for
L.
&
Econ.,
Rsch.
Paper
No.
20-22,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561164. The United Kingdom and the
European Union, as well as other countries around the world, have moved towards a stewardship
model by legislating stewardship codes, which state social and economic objectives. Id. at 103 n.10.
25. STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION, supra note 17.
26. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2020). Many did not amend their corporate
governance guidelines following the Business Roundtable statement. Id.
27. See FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM: A POLICY AGENDA
FOR SYSTEMS CHANGE (2020), https://www.wlrk.com/docs/From-Shareholder-Primacy-toStakeholder-Capitalism-TSC-and-B-Lab-White-Paper.pdf. This white paper, which was produced
by non-profit organizations B Lab and The Shareholder Commons, proposes the U.S. push through
a Stakeholder Capitalism Act. Id. at 11; see also Frederick Alexander, From Shareholder Primacy
to Stakeholder Capitalism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/26/from-shareholder-primacy-to-stakeholder-capitalism/;
Accountable Capitalism Act, https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Accountable%
20Capitalism%20Act%20One-Pager.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2020); STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE
OF A CORPORATION, supra note 17; Gregory V. Milano, The Return on Purpose: Before and During
a Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/09/the-return-on-purpose-before-and-during-a-crisis/;
Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaup, Shifting Influences on Corporate Governance: Capital
Market Completeness and Policy Channeling, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 2,
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This trend will hopefully lead to more empowered workers, increased
responsibility, and the ability to “grow the pie.”28 But it can also backfire
and be used and abused by management as a public relations tool, in a way
that will allow management to continue to control and exploit its workforce.29
This Article will focus on human capital and corporate governance.
Traditional corporate law scholars in the United States hold the view that the
legal relationships between labor, capital, and the firm are very different.30
Both labor and capital contribute to and invest in the firm; however, capital
shareholders (or their agents) are the ones who get to decide how the firm is
to be governed.31 Leading labor law scholars disagree. For example, Clyde
Summers postulates:
[T]he employees who provide the labor are as much members of
that enterprise as the shareholders who provide the capital. Indeed,
the employees may have made a much greater investment in the
enterprise by their years of service, may have much less ability to
withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the
enterprise than many of the stockholders.32
There is a paradigm shift regarding the role of talent, human capital, and
culture in corporate governance. This shift is driven by various influential
stakeholders, including the Global Reporting Initiative, the Embankment
Project for Inclusive Capitalism, the Business Roundtable, the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), and tech workers.33 These groups have identified
human capital and culture as important parts of a company’s intangible
assets, which “are now estimated to comprise on average 52% of a company’s
market value,” according to Ernst & Young.34 These groups are pushing
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/02/shifting-influences-on-corporate-governancecapital-market-completeness-and-policy-channeling/; Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the
Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose (2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589951.
28. EDMANS, supra note 22.
29. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 26.
30. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: The Fit
Between Employees and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret
Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
31. On the intersection of labor and capital as two principal inputs to the firm, see Rock &
Wachter, supra note 30. See also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious
Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1627 (2001).
32. Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and
Potentials, 4 J. COMPAR. CORP. L. & SEC. REGUL. 155, 170 (1982).
33. Stephen Klemash, Jennifer Lee & Jamie Smith, Human Capital: Key Findings from a
Survey of Public Company Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 24, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/24/human-capital-key-findings-from-a-survey-of-publiccompany-directors/.
34. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 16, at 1.
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management to modernize corporate decision-making and strategy to foster
innovation and create long-term value.35 There is a need to understand how
large companies are managing and measuring human capital.36
Corporate decisions and responses to this crisis have profound effects
on employee rights, employees’ role in the corporations that they serve, and
overall economic activity in the United States. Working conditions are one
of the main factors that directly contribute to underlying health conditions of
individuals and communities.37 The pandemic illuminates the disparities
between people who are able to work remotely from home and those that find
it very difficult to do so because of their social and economic conditions. The
disparities between people are exacerbated depending on the type of work
that they perform and the overall policies of their employers.38 Our health is
directly affected by the ways in which we “live, learn, work, and play.”39
What if directors (or managers) want to take these factors into account when
they make decisions about the future of their companies but are concerned
about their liability if they do? This Article answers the question of whether
our corporate law allows directors to take stakeholder interests into account.
It offers a pragmatic solution to the age-old debate: Our corporate governance
theory can be extended to include the protection of directors (or officers) if
they take employee interests into account in decision-making (as long as
there is no conflict of interest).
The Article further argues that if public companies decide to take
stakeholder interests into account, then they should be required to formally
change their charters (certificates of incorporation). Moreover, and more
35. Id.
36. For example, the Embankment Project for Inclusive Capitalism (“EPIC”) is a project
intended “to identify and create new metrics to measure and demonstrate long-term value to
financial markets.” COAL. FOR INCLUSIVE CAPITALISM, EMBANKMENT PROJECT FOR INCLUSIVE
CAPITALISM 4 (2018), https://www.epic-value.com/#report. EPIC was launched by the Coalition
for Inclusive Capitalism and Ernst & Young, and participated in by more than thirty asset owners
(such as Allstate, CalPERS and MetLife), asset managers (like Vanguard, State Street and Fidelity),
and companies (three of which are in the Top 100 Companies). Id.
37. See Health Equity Considerations & Racial & Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (July 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html; see also SHARON BLOCK & BENJAMIN SACHS,
CLEAN SLATE FOR WORKER POWER, WORKER POWER AND VOICE IN THE PANDEMIC RESPONSE
(2020), https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5fa42ded15984eaa002a7ef2/5fa42ded15984e5bc12a806c
_Clean%20Slate_Worker%20Power%20and%20Voice%20in%20the%20Pandemic%20Response.
pdf.
38. ELISE GOULD & VALERIE WILSON, ECON. POL’Y INST., BLACK WORKERS FACE TWO OF
THE MOST LETHAL PREEXISTING CONDITIONS FOR CORONAVIRUS—RACISM AND ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY (2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/; Laura Montenovo,
Xuan Jiang, Felipe Lozano Rojas, Ian M. Schmutte, Kosali Simon, Bruce A. Weinberg & Coady
Wing, Unequal Employment Impacts of COVID-19, ECONOFACT (June 1, 2020),
https://econofact.org/unequal-employment-impacts-of-covid-19.
39. Health Equity Considerations & Racial & Ethnic Minority Groups, supra note 37.
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importantly, they should be required to disclose additional information and
file periodically with the relevant state and federal authorities, akin to Public
Benefit Corporations (“PBCs”). They should be required to disclose to their
shareholders, and the public, information on their various efforts to promote
their public benefit mission and purpose, and the results of such efforts.
Different states have different reporting requirements for PBCs, which these
companies can easily follow.40 Moreover, there is new legislation that was
recently passed by the Delaware House of Representatives and signed into
law on July 16 by Delaware Governor John Carney. The 2020 amendments
to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “DGCL”) make
it easier for a traditional corporation to convert to a PBC.41 With regard to
federal authorities, the SEC should move to a prescriptive approach (a
specific line-item requirement) and require public companies to disclose
information on talent management.42 The SEC should further develop
agreed-upon metrics in order to assess these efforts and the reports on
performance results.
The following is an account of the long debate over the theory of the
firm and the purpose of the corporation. This Article contributes to the
literature in two ways: (1) by shedding light on new forms of tech employee

40. For more on the state by state required public reporting requirements, see Maxime
Verheyden, Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations: Importance, Compliance, and
Recommendations, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 37 (2018).
41. The amendments make changes to Delaware PBCs. For a full analysis of the changes and
the problems that they are addressing, see Richard Carroll, Chad Davis, Elizabeth Fenton, Alex
Ferraro, Richard Forsten, Jourdan Garvey, William Gee, Jessica Jones & Pamela Scott, 2020
Delaware General Corporation Law & Alternative Entity Amendments, JD SUPRA (July 23, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2020-delaware-general-corporation-law-69690/ (“First, the
amendments greatly reduce appraisal rights in connection with a conversion to a PBC. . . . .In
addition, the amendments remove certain super-majority voting provisions that previously applied
to PBCs. . . . .The amendments eliminate Sections 363(a) and 363(c) thus lowering the thresholds
to become, or transition away from being, a PBC to the statutory defaults of majority approval
(unless otherwise stated in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation). Finally, the amendments
clarify some lingering concerns regarding director liability in a PBC . . . This has important practical
implications for directorial exculpation from liability and indemnification.”). For more analysis,
see Soyoung Ho, SEC Adopts Disclosure Rule on Human Capital Management, THOMSON
REUTERS TAX & ACCT. (Aug. 28, 2020), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/sec-adoptsdisclosure-rule-on-human-capital-management/.
42. On August 26, 2020, the SEC voted to adopt amendments to modernize the description of
business (Item 101), legal proceedings (Item 103), and risk factor disclosures (Item 105) that
registrants are required to make pursuant to Regulation S-K. The new disclosure rules affect how
public companies manage their human capital. It should be noted that the SEC specifically decided
against the prescriptive approach (under Item 101 of Regulation S-K) and instead the new disclosure
is based on materiality “to the extent such disclosures would be material to an understanding of the
registrant’s business.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule Amendments to Modernize
Disclosures of Business, Legal Proceedings, and Risk Factors Under Regulation S-K (Aug. 26,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-192. See infra Part VIII for more analysis on
this.
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activism and the ways in which they affect traditional corporate governance
practices; and (2) by proposing a simple pragmatic strategic management
solution to the age-old debate over shareholder versus stakeholder corporate
governance, by suggesting a focus on disclosure of information to the public.
The following is an overview of the parts in this Article, and the research
questions addressed in the respective Parts.
Part II sheds light on recent tech employee activism.43 Part III provides
a review of the development of research on the theory of the firm, including
principal-agent, property rights, and team production.44 Part IV provides a
review of the long debate over the purpose of the corporation and introduces
the new personhood theory.45 The purpose of Parts III and IV is to lay the
foundation to a new proposed suggestion to the old debate over the purpose
of the corporation model. They present the historic-doctrinal review of the
development of theory-of-the-firm research, which is the basis for this
Article’s theme and discussions, as well as introduce some pioneers who have
fashioned the theory of the firm research during the past few decades.
Parts V, VI and VII propose different solutions.46 Part V proposes the
expansion of director fiduciary duty.47 It asks the question: Where does
fiduciary duty lie? Can directors who take actions to maximize the benefit
of stakeholders, such as employees, enjoy the protections of the business
judgement rule (“BJR”)? Part VI deals with the problem of inadequate
monitoring of public management and proposes to require public companies
that choose to take stakeholder interests into account to re-incorporate as
PBCs.48 Part VII proposes to require public companies that choose to take
stakeholder interests into account to disclose information.49 Part VIII
concludes that companies that create value for society can also deliver greater
returns to investors.50 To do so, companies need to invest in their
stakeholders for the long run.51
II. TECH EMPLOYEE ACTIVISM
Why focus our attention on employees? This Article focuses on the
employees, the “E” in “EESG,” which stands for Employee, Environmental,
43. See infra Part II.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. See infra Parts V–VII.
47. See infra Part V.
48. See infra Part VI.
49. See infra Part VII.
50. See infra Part VIII.
51. There are many studies on this. I recommend reading Edmans’s new book for examples on
companies that are successful in this. EDMANS, supra note 22.
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Social, and Governance priorities.52 The term EESG was coined by Leo
Strine, Jr., the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.53 Strine
calls on corporate America to take employee interests into account in its
decision-making.54
Strine’s suggestions perhaps struck a chord with the business
community, as evidenced by the recent controversial Business Roundtable
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, which included investing in
employees as a priority. 55 Unfortunately, as noted above, Bebchuck showed
in his paper that many companies are probably using the statement as a public
relations move and have not taken drastic steps to implement their own
suggestions.56
So, why do CEOs care about their employees? Or at least make a public
statement that they care about them? The driving forces for the current
changes in the rhetoric of business leaders (and policymakers) stem from the
pressure of investors and employees. This Article will focus on the
employees. Tech employees started a revolution and now force the
management and boards of large tech companies to take their interests and
opinions into account, as well as the purpose of the corporation, in
governance, decision-making, and political activity.57
The recent COVID-19 pandemic expands the disparities between capital
and labor. It has profound effects on employee rights and the overall
economic activity in the United States.58 Unfortunately, the pandemic did
not spare the tech industry. Public and private tech employees, working in
large to small companies, have been affected in ways ranging from changes
to their work environments to massive layoffs. Thanks to websites such as
Layoff.com, which collects data on tech industry cuts, there are reports on

52. Strine, Jr., supra note 1, at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION, supra note 17.
56. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 26 at 3–4. Many did not amend their corporate
governance guidelines following the Business Roundtable statement. Id. at 25.
57. See Anat Alon-Beck, The Facebook Saga: When Tech Employees Revolt, FORBES (July 22,
2020, 2:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/07/22/the-facebook-saga-whentech-employees-revolt/?sh=18021ef56c32; see also Silicon Valley Revolt: Meet the Tech Workers
Fighting Their Bosses Over Ice, Censorship and Racism (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/28/tech-workers-silicon-valley-activism;
Matt
Lavietes, Silicon Valley Firms Are Facing a Rise in Anger From a New Source: Their Own
Employees, CNBC (July 8, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/05/tech-ceos-arelosing-unilateral-power-rapidly-in-a-new-unexpected-way.html.
58. World Economic Situation and Prospects: April 2020 Briefing, No. 136, UNITED NATIONS
(Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/world-economic-situationand-prospects-april-2020-briefing-no-136/.
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over 80,000 tech employees who lost their jobs.59 Did the fear of layoffs
stifle tech employee activism? Surprisingly—no.
On June 1, 2020, many employees of Facebook, Inc. publicly voiced
their disagreement with their management’s decision for the first time.
Specifically, they opposed CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s decision to not remove
from its platform a post by President Trump on the Floyd protests, which
followed a week of demonstrations and riots across the country.60 Tech
employee activism in the form of protest against the employer is not a new
phenomenon. It can take several forms and involve governance issues that
are internal, including employment related conditions (such as pay), or
external, including social issues, such as ethics concerning development,
production, or government contracts.
In the Facebook example, employee activism took two forms: collective
and individual.61 In the individual context, Facebook employees turned to
social media platforms and the Internet to publicly disagree with
Zuckerberg’s inaction.62 There are even reports of some employees who
went as far as to quit their jobs or call on Zuckerberg to quit his job.63 In the
collective context, on Monday, June 1, 2020, the employees organized a
virtual strike against the company. Zuckerberg controls 57.9% of the voting
rights on Facebook’s board, but despite this fact, while Zuckerberg and his
management team took the complaints very seriously, they did not impose
content restrictions or warnings initially. Furthermore, the public complaints
represent a shift in Facebook employees’ expectations, which is evident from

59. See LAYOFFS TRACKER, https://layoffs.fyi/tracker/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2020). Layoffs.fyi
has tracked all tech startup layoffs since the coronavirus was declared a pandemic. Id. The data is
compiled primarily from public reports. Id.; see also Sarah McBride & Christopher Cannon, Covid19 Brings a Reckoning of Layoffs to Silicon Valley, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-coronavirus-technology-layoffs.
60. Ryan Mac & Alex Kantrowitz, Tweets, Dissent, and a Walkout: Facebook Employees
Revolt Over Zuckerberg’s Approach to Trump, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 1, 2020, 6:03 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/tweets-walkout-facebook-employees-zuckerbergtrump-protest (“Last Thursday, in addressing protests in Minneapolis, Trump wrote on Twitter and
Facebook that ‘when the looting starts, the shooting starts,’ a historically charged phrase that
suggested that violent action would be taken against protesters.”).
61. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Employee Activism in the Tech Industry, LEXOLOGY
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7b9aa959-64ef-46de-a969c1abed649d22.
62. Sheera Frenkel, Mike Isaac, Cecilia Kang & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Facebook Employees
Stage Virtual Walkout to Protest Trump Posts, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/technology/facebook-employee-protest-trump.html.
63. Donie O’Sullivan, Exclusive: He Quit His Facebook Job Because of Zuckerberg’s Inaction
on
Trump’s
Posts,
CNN
(June
5,
2020,
6:32
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/business/facebook-employee-resigns/index.html.
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the employees disparaging their employer and making public complaints.64
These actions cause not only reputational damage to Facebook as an
employer, but also impose higher costs for the firm in monitoring its labor
force.65
On June 6, 2020, scientists funded by the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative
(“CZI”) sent a letter criticizing Zuckerberg and “Facebook’s role in diffusing
inaccurate information”; some even called for Zuckerberg to resign.66
Facebook’s decision was in contrast to the decision of another social media
platform and rival—Twitter. Twitter’s management responded to employee
activism differently by placing a warning label on President Trump’s tweet,
which included the same message as his post on Facebook. On June 17, 2020,
a few weeks after the public employee revolt, civil rights activists—a
coalition consisting of Color Of Change, NAACP, ADL, Sleeping Giants,
Free Press, and Common Sense Media —joined the revolution and started a
campaign against Facebook called “Stop Hate for Profit.”67 The Stop Hate
for Profit campaign persuaded many of Facebook’s advertisers to boycott the
company and stop spending advertising money on Facebook and Instagram.68
Large companies joined the campaign and included The North Face (the
first to join), REI, Patagonia, Unilever, Verizon, and more. This campaign
managed to hurt Facebook’s reputation and financial interests. Facebook’s
stock dropped more than 7% after Unilever announced that it would no longer
advertise on the platform, stating that “[c]ontinuing to advertise on these

64. Judith Samuelson, Why Do We Still Call It Capitalism?, QUARTZ AT WORK (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://work.qz.com/1247835/spotifys-ipo-should-make-us-consider-why-we-still-use-the-termcapitalism/.
65. For more on private tech companies and unicorn employee activism, see generally AlonBeck, supra note 13. See Vladimir Atanasov, Vladimir Ivanov & Kate Litvak, The Impact of
Litigation on Venture Capitalist Reputation 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
13641, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13641. For more on agency costs and reputation, see
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
66. COLLECTIVE ACTION IN TECH, https://collectiveaction.tech (last visited June 30, 2020).
67. See STOP HATE FOR PROFIT, ’https://www.stophateforprofit.org/demand-change (last
visited June 30, 2020). See also Afdhel Aziz, Facebook Ad Boycott Campaign ‘Stop Hate for Profit’
Gathers Momentum and Scale: Inside the Movement for Change, FORBES (June 24, 2020, 10:35
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/afdhelaziz/2020/06/24/facebook-ad-boycott-campaign-stophate-for-profit-gathers-momentum-and-scale-inside-the-movement-for-change/#6110d2a16687.
68. The Color of Change website states: “From the monetization of hate speech to
discrimination in their algorithms to the proliferation of voter suppression to the silencing of Black
voices, Facebook has refused to take responsibility for hate, bias, and discrimination growing on
their platforms. And what has allowed Facebook to continue racist practices is the $70B of revenue
from corporations every year. Companies have a choice to make about whether they want their
businesses featured on Facebook’s platforms side-by-side with racist attacks on Black people.”
Calling on Facebook Corporate Advertisers to Pause Ads for July 2020, COLOR OF CHANGE (June
19, 2020), https://colorofchange.org/stop-hate-for-profit/.
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platforms at this time would not add value to people and society.”69
Therefore, it is not surprising that on June 26, 2020, Zuckerberg caved to the
mounting public and economic pressure, despite his fears of regulation by the
government, and announced new policies. Facebook’s employees won the
battle.
Twitter and Facebook are not alone. Since 2018, Amazon,70 Google,71
Microsoft,72 Salesforce73 and other tech giants have also dealt with employee
activism, in which the companies have been asked to alter their dealings with
the federal government and cancel government contracts due to ethical, geopolitical concerns and the purpose of their corporation. These cases highlight
the fact that tech employees have the power to change the status quo.
It is not surprising that tech employees are the ones leading by activism.
They are turning their attention to their employers—large corporations and
the managers who manage them. They are calling on their employers to take
corporate social responsibility into account. Perhaps they will be able to do
what policymakers, academics, and leading lawyers were not able to do, and
that is to change our current corporate law to mirror social movements, to
take stakeholder interests into account, to resist short-termism, and to achieve
long-term value by forcing their employers to incorporate in their charters a
deep obligation to act for the benefit of society at large.
A. Tech Employees vs. Non-Tech Employees
Tech employees are different than employees in other industries for the
following reasons. First, our economy is based on knowledge and, as such,
it relies on intangible assets, which are comprised of brain power. As stated
69. Jon Swartz, Facebook Reverses Policies as Ad Boycott Sends Stock Down, MARKETWATCH
(June 28, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/facebook-shares-drop-7-asunilever-halts-advertising-prompting-changes-at-social-networking-giant-2020-0626?mod=investing.
70. See Ali Breland, Trump Era Ramps Up Tech Worker Revolt, HILL (June 30, 2018, 6:27
PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/394597-trump-era-ramps-up-tech-worker-revolt (“At
Amazon, workers banded together to oppose the company selling its facial recognition software to
law enforcement agencies out of fears the technology could harm marginalized communities.”).
71. See id. (“Google said it would not renew its Project Maven contract with the Pentagon,
reportedly because of pressure from employees.”).
72. See id. (“Microsoft employees are pushing CEO Satya Nadella to drop the company’s
contract with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in protest over the agency separating
children from families caught crossing the southern border illegally.”). Also, on June 8, 2020,
Microsoft employees used a Facebook group—”Young Microsoft FTEs”—to revolt against
Microsoft. COLLECTIVE ACTION IN TECH., supra note 66. The Tech Workers Coalition reported
that “Hundreds of Microsoft employees have signed a letter to the company’s top executives asking
for Microsoft to take action in the wake of national protests.” Id.
73. See Breland, supra note 70 (“Salesforce workers earlier this week penned their own letter to
CEO Marc Benioff urging him to review its contract with Customs and Border Protection, also out
of concern with the administration’s family separation policy.”).
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by Colin Mayer in his new book, Prosperity: Better Business Makes the
Greater Good:
Over the last forty years there has been a remarkable
transformation in the corporation. Forty years ago, 80 per cent of
the market value of US corporations was attributed to tangible
assets—plant, machinery, and buildings—as against intangibles—
licenses, patents, and research development. Today, intangible
assets account for 85 per cent of the market value of US
corporations.74
Second, tech employees are highly educated, trained and paid.
According to the labor market analysis, when employees receive specific
training, they are very valuable to the firm, and turnover is very costly.75
There are similarly qualified, but less experienced, employees who would
have to acquire the requisite skills before they can reach the level of the
employee that left the firm. Therefore, employment contracts with tech
employees are designed as long-term contracts to prevent their departure.76
Third, U.S. tech companies are engaged in a war for talent,77 where they
experience difficulty with attracting, engaging, and retaining talent.78
Retaining talent and preventing “leakage from firm knowledge resources to
other competitors” is therefore incredibly important to the employer firm.
High-tech firms can control knowledge hazards by adopting stock option
plans. According to Gorga and Halberstam, in general, startup tech firms use
equity compensation to avoid the high costs associated with employee
turnover and prevent the negative effect that high employee turnover has on
company morale.79
Finally, tech employees are usually also equity holders (shareholders)
in their firm, as I explain in my paper, Unicorn Stock Options.80 Employee
option grants made it possible for employees to participate in the growth of
the business without having to put significant amounts of capital at risk to
74. MAYER, supra note 21, at 31.
75. See Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris, Understanding the
Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 253 (1975).
76. Id.
77. See Elizabeth G. Chambers, Mark Foulon, Helen Handfield-Jones, Steven M. Hankin &
Edward G. Michaels III, The War for Talent, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 44, 46 (1998). Chambers et al. coined
the term “war for talent.” Id. at 44; see also Shira Ovide, Honey, I Shrunk Apple’s Profit Margins,
BLOOMBERG OP. (Aug. 2, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/201808-02/apple-aapl-at-1-trillion-honey-i-shrunk-the-profit-margins.
78. See Chambers et al., supra note 77, at 46–47; see also Amir Efrati & Peter Schulz, How
Tech Firms Stack Up on Pay, THE INFORMATION (Sept. 13, 2016, 12:45 PM),
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/how-tech-firms-stack-up-on-pay.
79. See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1185, 1192
(2007).
80. Alon-Beck, supra note 13, at 136.
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pay the ordinary income tax that otherwise would be immediately due on the
additional cash compensation needed to win the war for talent.81 This
mechanism became popular due to the recognition that employee equitysharing improves overall firm productivity, shareholder returns, and profit
levels.82
The practice of giving startup employees equity (share-ownership) and
the promise of equity (options) in order to attract, engage, and retain talent is
very important. It improves overall company performance and allows the
employees in the firm, who contributed their sweat equity—“human
capital”—to benefit from the gains of the firm’s success following an IPO.
The issue of equity compensation is very relevant to the stakeholder
capitalism debate. Some stakeholder theory scholars believe that we need to
reform the pay structures of public companies by providing broad-based
equity compensation to all employees, which will contribute to better firm
performance.83
According to Edmans, broad-based employee share compensation can
benefit society in a way that grows the pie.84 Edmans suggests that we do not
cut the CEO’s pay and redistribute it to others in the company (which will
split the pie differently), but rather give the CEO incentives to grow the pie
and create long-term value by investing in stakeholders.85 Edmans postulates
that, “while growing the pie is important, the division must also be fair.86 If
the firm succeeds, it’s not just down to the CEO—workers contributed
substantially also. If they are given shares, they’ll benefit from a larger pie,
rather than all the gains going to executives.”87 But, unfortunately, in other
industries in the United States, not only do employees not get any equity but
according to a recent study by Stansbury and Summers, there is a decline in

81. In order to attract labor to Silicon Valley, startups used stock option plans. See William
Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be
Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 865 (2013); see also WILLIAM LAZONICK, SUSTAINABLE
PROSPERITY IN THE NEW ECONOMY? BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND HIGH-TECH EMPLOYMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 39–79 (2009) (discussing the Cisco example).
82. See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1901, 1901 (2001) (“These options could take many forms, but there is remarkable conformity in
the practice of giving a class of employees a large percentage of compensation . . . . . .in the form
of options . . . .”); see also Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar
of Innovation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 589–606 (2013) (discussing at-will contracts and
equity compensation).
83. Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory
and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23596, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23596/w23596.pdf
84. EDMANS, supra note 22.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 39–40.
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overall worker power.88 They postulate that the decline started in the 1980s
and that the following three factors contributed to it:
First, institutional changes: the policy environment has become
less supportive of worker power by reducing the incidence of
unionism and the credibility of the “threat effect” of unionism or
other organized labor, and the real value of the minimum wage has
fallen. Second, changes within firms: the increase in shareholder
power and shareholder activism has led to pressures on companies
to cut labor costs, resulting in wage reductions within firms and the
“fissuring” of the workplace as companies increasingly outsource
and subcontract labor. And third, changes in economic conditions:
increased competition for labor from technology or from low-wage
countries has increased the elasticity of demand for U.S. labor, or,
in the parlance of bargaining theory, has improved employers’
outside option.89
Therefore, the enigma continues: Can the revolt by tech employees lead
to a shift in the prevalent corporate governance theory from current
shareholder-centric corporate governance to collaborative (stakeholdercentric) corporate governance model? Maybe time will tell. But one thing
is clear: Tech workers are accumulating power by organizing, unionizing,
and forming tech cooperatives.90 Their activism concerns various issues,
including external social and ethical considerations regarding investment,
development, production, and manufacturing. This activism contributed to a
paradigm shift in thinking about talent management and corporate culture.
As noted above, in 2020, CEOs realized that they needed to take their talent
seriously. Therefore, shareholder primacy is not a good business strategy for
attracting, engaging, and retaining their workforce.
The following is a discussion on the purpose of the corporation and the
challenges associated with calls for change.
III. THEORY OF THE FIRM
On June 24, 2020, at 9:00 AM EST, like many young corporate law
scholars around the United States, I eagerly watched an online debate called
“Stakeholder versus Shareholder Capitalism: The Great Debate” between
Oxford Professor Colin Mayer and Harvard Professor Lucian Bebchuck.91 It
88. Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An
Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193.
89. Id. at 2–3.
90. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
91. University of Oxford, Saïd Business School, Stakeholder Versus Shareholder Capitalism:
The
Great
Debate,
YOUTUBE
(June
25,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=cUpyL1zVF50&feature=emb_title.
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was indeed a great debate. The debate illustrated the differences between
U.S. and UK corporate thinking on the theory of the firm and the purpose of
the corporation.
Since the end of the twentieth century,92 the views of Milton Friedman93
and Michael Jensen94 have become popular in the United States for using
shareholder primacy as a corporate governance model.95 These theories
mandate that management of large public firms maximize managerial
opportunism, “shareholder (read Wall Street) supremacy” and shorttermism.96 Therefore, management cannot realistically pursue long-term
projects, such as research and development, because such projects cannot
produce instant financial returns to the shareholders.97
Moreover, stakeholder scholars criticize shareholder scholars98 for
advocating for shareholder primacy, which centers solely on the interests of
shareholders as the “sole residual claimants” and “owners” of the
corporations, ignoring all the other stakeholders.99 They further suggest that
92. See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 711 (2015)
(“Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, American public companies began to change.
The shift began in academia with the rise of the Chicago School of free market economists.
Influential economic thinkers like Milton Friedman and Michael Jensen, apparently viewing the
public corporation rather like a gigantic sole proprietorship, argued that the absence of shareholder
power in public companies noted by Berle and Means was a problem to be solved rather than a
deliberate legal strategy to achieve asset lock-in.”) (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law? in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2004).
93. See generally Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine— The Social Responsibility of
Business
Is
to
Increase
its
Profits,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
13,
1970),
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-ofbusiness-is-to.html (publishing under the name Fulton Friedman); see also LYNN STOUT, THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 18 (2012).
94. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also STOUT, supra
note 93, at 18.
95. See also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History of Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001).
96. See Greenfield, supra note 23, at 749; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 92, at 712 n.88
(“[T]his assumption is tantamount to assuming that shareholders act like psychopaths who are
indifferent to the consequences that their investing decisions impose on others.”); Stout, supra note
92, at 711–12 (maximizing “shareholder value” means maximizing the increase of share price and
dividends).
97. See Stout, supra note 92, at 712.
98. See Stout, supra note 92, at 711.
99. Id. at 711 n.87 (“Rather than owning corporations, shareholders own shares, which are a
contract with the corporate entity. Similarly, the corporate entity is its own residual claimant. While
the idea of shareholder ‘ownership’ of the firm might be forgiven as a convenient and harmless
metaphor when describing a company with a controlling shareholder, it is grossly misleading when
applied to a board-controlled company.”) (citation omitted).
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investors focus on short-term results due to their emphasis on stock market
liquidity.100 In the words of Lynn Stout, “shareholder value thinking had
replaced managerialism as the dominant business philosophy in public
corporations.”101
That is why stakeholder scholars from around the world are calling for
a radical change in the theory and philosophy of current corporate
governance theory.102 The corporate patterns and theories that we observe
today are not merely products and consequences of the technology or
development narratives, but lie in politics and economic philosophy as
well.103 Therefore, one of the goals of this Article is to touch on
managerialism, which is supposed to allow boards of directors to plan for a
long-term strategy of growth to benefit society as a whole.104
Before diving into the different theories of why firms exist, it must be
noted that the UK recently changed its corporate governance code effective
January 1, 2019.105 The changes were meant to restore public trust in UK

100. See COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND
HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013); STOUT, supra note 93, at 16–18 (“The short-term focus of
investors and corporate boards is currently one of the key issues in the corporate governance
debate.”); Ira M. Millstein, Re-examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (Mar. 11, 2013), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/author/ira-m-millstein/ (“[C]orporate
boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out to whom they owe their
fiduciary duties.. . . . Some activists are using their newfound power to sway and bully management
to focus on the short term, meet the quarterly targets and disgorge cash in extra dividends or stock
buy backs in lieu of investing in long-term growth.”). Therefore, it is not surprising that recent
empirical research already shows that even profitable technology companies these days increasingly
prefer to stay private as long as possible in order to avoid the pressures of short-term strategies that
result from public ownership. See Rival Versions of Capitalism: The Endangered Public Company,
ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21555562; Joann S. Lublin &
Spencer E. Ante, A Fight in Silicon Valley: Founders Push for Control, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2012,
11:50 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577519134168240996.
101. See Stout, supra note 92, at 713. Stout also refers to the work of corporate scholar Edward
Rock, who stated that “[m]anagers now largely think and act like shareholders.” Id. (quoting
Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1988
(2013)).
102. The initiative is led by Professors Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair. See STOUT, supra note
93; Greenfield, supra note 23, at 749; see also Kent Greenfield, The Stakeholder Strategy, 26
DEMOCRACY 47, 48 (2012).
103. An examination of classic corporate governance theory will demonstrate that “the public
corporation is as much a political adaptation as an economic or technological necessity.” Mark J.
Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10 (1991).
104. See Anat Alon-Beck, The Coalition Model, a Private-Public Strategic Innovation Policy
Model for Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the Era of New Economic
Challenges, 17 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 267 (2018).
105. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2018),
https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-governancecode (effective for accounting periods beginning on or after Jan. 1., 2019).
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businesses and to focus on the purpose of the corporation.106 Additionally,
the British Academy started a large and ambitious project—the “Future of
the Corporation”—that concludes “the purpose of business is to solve the
problems of people and planet profitably, and not profit from causing
problems.”107
One of the most outspoken voices is that of Colin Mayer, who postulates
that “constraining the firm to a single narrow objective has had wide-ranging
and damaging consequences: economic, environmental, political, and
social.”108 He further states that “it is only once one has defined a company’s
purposes that one can ascertain either its appropriate structure and conduct or
its performance.”109 He rejects the view that regulation is an appropriate
response to firm misbehavior. He rather mainly relies on a firm’s
commitment to corporate purpose.
Critics of Mayer’s view point out that we cannot put “too much faith in
private ordering proclamations of a ‘corporate purpose’ or of a set of values.”
If we give too much discretion to executives to take stakeholder interests into
account, we run into the risk of enhancing their powers and insulating them
from oversight and criticism, while diminishing the need for regulations.110
Another popular view is that of Alex Edmans, who postulates that
“companies can create both profit and social value.”111 Edmans advocates
for using the new theory of his pieconomics, which is an approach to business
that “seeks to create profits only through creating value for society.”112
Edmans further states that pieconomics “doesn’t imply unfettered pursuit of
106. The New Code principles are on: (1) alignment of company purpose, strategy, values and
corporate culture; (2) effective engagement with shareholders and stakeholders; (3) responsibilities
of the board to ensure that workforce policies and practices are consistent with the company’s values
and support its long-term sustainable success; (4) consideration of the length of service of the board
as a whole and the need for regular board refreshment; and (5) alignment of remuneration and
workforce policies to the long-term success of the company and its values. Id. The New Code
provisions are on: (1) the board’s role in monitoring and assessing culture; (2) mechanisms for
gathering the views of the workforce; (3) reporting on how stakeholder interests, and the other
matters set out in section 172, have influenced the board’s decision-making; (4) succession planning
and board member contribution; (5) diversity and inclusion; (6) the length of tenure of the chair; (7)
board responsibility for identifying and assessing emerging risks (in addition to the principal risks);
(8) holding periods for long-term incentive schemes; and (9) pension arrangements. Id.
107. THE BRITISH ACAD., PRINCIPLES FOR PURPOSEFUL BUSINESS: HOW TO DELIVER THE
FRAMEWORK
FOR
THE
FUTURE
OF
THE
CORPORATION
8
(2019),
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/224/future-of-the-corporation-principlespurposeful-business.pdf.
108. See MAYER, supra note 21, at 34.
109. See MAYER, supra note 21, at 7.
110. Marco Ventoruzzo, On ‘Prosperity’ by Colin Mayer: Brief Critical Remarks on the (Legal)
Relevance of Announcing a Multi-Stakeholders ‘Corporate Purpose’ 10 (Bocconi Legal Stud.
Research Paper No. 3546139, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3546139.
111. See EDMANS, supra note 22, at 3.
112. See EDMANS, supra note 22, at 3.
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social goals, cheerfully ignoring profits.”113 Edmans understands the agency
cost problems and the potential for abuse.
The following is an overview of three competing theories that attempt
to explain why firms exist. My suggestion works best when understanding
the normative foundations and analysis of the team production approach.
There are many competing economic theories that try to explain why firms
exist.114 The main three theories are the principal-agent approach,115 property
rights approach,116 and team production approach.117
The principal-agent and property rights approaches are highlighted
extensively in current economics and law writings.118 However, according
to scholars Blair and Stout, when these theories are applied to public firms,
they are lacking.119 Therefore, there is a need to center on the team
production approach.120

113. See EDMANS, supra note 22, at 31.
114. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937); Charles R.T.
O’Kelley, Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on
Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247,
1250 (2012) (“[C]oase . . . saw the firm as having an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ and a distinct central
actor—the entrepreneur. . . . Coase looked inside the firm and identified the entrepreneur as the
central economic actor; it was the entrepreneur who consciously allocated resources within the firm
by command.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 257 n.19 (1999) (“Coase answered that a key feature of production in a firm is
a ‘hierarchical’ structure under which an entrepreneur who needs to acquire materials and services
retains the right to direct the exact details of what and how products or services are delivered. A
firm, therefore, consists of the systems of relationships which come into existence ‘[when] the
direction of resources . . . becomes dependent on the buyer.’ Firms emerge, Coase speculated, when
it would be too costly and complicated to write contracts that give the buyer of the product or
services the necessary degree of control. Coase’s analysis focuses on why entrepreneurial firms
exist. . . . Coase’s entrepreneur could solve her problem (the need to direct or control the product or
service she is buying) using separate employment contracts between the entrepreneur and each
employee. Hence Coase’s theory of the ‘firm’ does not tell us why ‘corporations’ are needed.”)
(citations omitted).
115. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 257–58 (noting that this approach “explores
contracting problems that arise when one actor hires another to act on her behalf”).
116. See id. at 258 (observing that this path “examines problems associated with coordinating
productive activities where it is too costly to write and enforce complete contracts, focusing
especially on the role played by property rights as a solution for closing contractual gaps”).
117. See id. (noting that this path “considers the role hierarchy may play in policing against
shirking problems that may arise in coordinating team production”).
118. See, e.g., id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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A. Principal-Agent
Agency problems are viewed today as the main issue that corporate law
scholarship has to resolve.121 Contemporary scholars122 use agency law to
explain the notion that the corporation is comprised of collections of assets
that are jointly owned by principals (shareholders), who hire agents (directors
and officers) to manage the corporation’s assets on their behalf.123 They
further contend that the shareholders are powerless because shareholders do
not have the same knowledge of the firm’s operations as managers do. The
managers, therefore, always have the potential for exercising abusive
behavior such as cheating, mismanaging, and stealing from the shareholders.
According to legal scholar Frank Easterbrook, “[e]ven when they do not, the
potential of misconduct remains.”124
The Agency solution to such problems is to give shareholders powers
over directors, such as allowing shareholders to remove boards that do not
perform according to shareholder expectations, or strapping executive pay to
shareholder profits.125

121. See Stout, supra note 92, at 705 (“Indeed, a casual reader could be forgiven for concluding
that the only problem posed by corporate entities is the challenge of eliminating the waste that results
when corporate managers fail to run firms in an optimal fashion (usually assumed to be a profitmaximizing fashion).”); see also Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric
Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1909–10 (recounting the ways in which agency costs are viewed
as “the central problem of U.S. corporate law”).
122. The subsequent are examples of scholars who utilize the principal-agent model. In legal
theory, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991), and Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992). In
economics, see Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 289 (1980) (“The firm is viewed as a set of contracts among factors of production, with each
factor motivated by its self-interest. . . . In the classical theory, the agent who personifies the firm is
the entrepreneur who is taken to be both manager and residual risk bearer. . . . The main thesis of
this paper is that separation of security ownership and control can be explained as an efficient form
of economic organization within the ‘set of contracts’ perspective.”).
123. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94.
124. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 122, at 1.
125. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
700 (2007) (arguing that shareholders should have added powers to remove boards of directors);
see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that shareholder returns should be tied to executive
pay); See Lucian Arye Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 835 (2005) (“[A]s part of their power to amend governance arrangements, shareholders should
be able to adopt provisions that would give them subsequently a specified power to intervene in
additional corporate decisions. Power to intervene in game-ending decisions (to merge, sell all
assets, or dissolve) could address management’s bias in favor of the company’s continued existence.
Power to intervene in scaling-down decisions (to make cash or in-kind distributions) could address
management’s tendency to retain excessive funds and engage in empire-building. Shareholders’
ability to adopt, when necessary, provisions that give themselves a specified additional power to
intervene could thus produce benefits in many companies.”); see Stout, supra note 92.
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There are four problems with the Agency solution. First, the agency
theory doesn’t take into account directors’ motivation to serve the
corporation and the stakeholders to the best of their ability in order to keep
their reputation and position.126 Second, as a result of the emphasis on the
interests of “present-day shareholders,” managers and directors are having
difficulty with pursuing long-term strategies.127 Third, sometimes the agent
in a public corporation is the one that has “trouble getting the principal to
perform her end of the deal.”128 Fourth, there is “fundamental ambiguity” in
public corporations with regard to which party has control over the other, and
which party is the one who is contributing the productive inputs.129
B. Property Rights
The firm is defined as a “bundle of assets under common ownership,”130
which has “a contractual structure with: 1) joint input production; 2) several
input owners; 3) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint
inputs; 4) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of
contracts with other input owners; 5) who holds the residual claim; and 6)
who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status.”131
According to Blair and Stout, this theory does not distinguish between
ownership and control of shareholders in a public corporation.132 In reality,

126. See Stout, supra note 92, at 706 n.66 (“The primary motivation for directors to do their best
to serve corporate entities may be some combination of the desire to keep the entity healthy so they
can keep their board positions; the desire to maintain and build their own status and reputations as
business leaders; and the altruistic desire to benefit the executives, employees, customers, and
shareholders to whom they may feel a sense of obligation. History has proven that this imperfect
set of incentives can be sufficient to allow board-controlled nonprofit and for-profit corporate
entities to survive and thrive for decades and even centuries, and play major roles in the global
economy.”); see also Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You
Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board ), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2003)
(discussing the effects of the business judgment rule—because of the business judgment rule,
directors can still shirk their duties and fail to devote adequate time and attention to the corporate
entity).
127. See STOUT, supra note 93, at 7 (“[I]nfluential economic and legal experts are proposing
alternative theories of the legal structure and economic purpose of public corporations that show
how a relentless focus on raising the share price of individual firms may be not only misguided, but
harmful to investors.”).
128. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 259.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 278; see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986); Oliver
Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1763 n.28
(1989).
131. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794 (1972).
132. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 278.
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the shareholders do not directly control the public corporation.133
Additionally, it is hard to view the shareholders of public corporations as
owners of the firm (a bundle of assets), because of the intangible nature of
the key assets of the public corporation—including intellectual property,
human-capital, and knowledge.134 It is very hard to put a price on, evaluate,
and—if need be—sell these intangible assets to a third party in order for the
shareholders to retrieve any portion of their investment.135 Viewing the
public corporation as a bundle of assets under common management is
misleading, according to Blair and Stout.136 Therefore, they propose a
different approached called “team production.”137
C. Team Production
“Team production” proposes to view the public corporation as a “nexus
of firm-specific investments.”138 According to the team production theory,
the public corporation should be regarded as a “team of people who enter[ed]
into a complex arrangement to work together for their mutual gain.”139 The
public corporation, therefore, is viewed as a team of employees, shareholders,
and other stakeholders, who contracted to partake in a process of dispute
resolution and internal goal setting.140
Directors of public corporations are trustees who take into account the
interests of all the stakeholders and are regarded as “mediating hierarchs.”141
Therefore, directors should not solely concentrate on maximizing
shareholder returns and should instead settle the competing claims of all
stakeholders. They are “hired” to “limit shirking and deter rent-seeking
behavior among team members.”142

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 131, at 794.
136. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 277.
137. See infra Part C.
138. See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 275 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 278.
140. See id. According to Blair and Stout, stakeholders in a corporation “enter into a ‘pactum
subjectionis’ under which they yield control over outputs and key inputs (time, intellectual skills,
or financial capital) to the hierarchy.” Id. at 278 (citation omitted).
141. See id. at 281.
142. Id. at 274. This theory leads to the next theory that was developed by Lynn Stout. See
Stout, supra note 92, at 685–86.
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IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION
What is the purpose of the corporation?143 There is an old debate over
the purpose of the corporation.144 This is part of a 1930s Harvard Law
Review debate between two notable corporate law scholars: Adolfe A. Berle,
Jr.145 and Merrick E. Dodd.146 This debate about the purpose of the
corporation includes a dispute about the roles and responsibilities of
corporate managers and directors and continues to this day.147 The debate
takes place in the law, labor, finance, and management literatures.
This question is still very much relevant today because of the dominance
of Berle’s148 view, which holds that the main purpose of the company is to
increase its profits, thereby increasing the value of its shares or bonds to the
benefit of its members or shareholders, so as to increase their financial gains.
Lynn Stout was one of the prominent legal scholars who called for a radical
change in the theory and philosophy of current corporate governance
theory.149
According to Stout, the rise of shareholder primacy thinking began in
the 1970s with the rise of the so-called “Chicago School of free-market
143. Fisch & Solomon, supra note 24.
144. Id. at 101.
145. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365 (1932) (arguing in favor of profit as a corporation’s sole purpose).
146. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932) (arguing that a corporation has both profit-making and social service purposes).
147. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1423, 1442 (1993) (addressing the
debate over corporate responsibility set off by the growing prominence of corporations and the
increasing independent power of managers); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of
Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1385–86 (2008) (observing a debate in the contemporary
corporate governance space); Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social
Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 J. BUS. L. 631, 633 (2009) (discussing “the
ambiguities of corporate law by challenging corporate governance models that favor only one view
of corporate purpose, and by identifying the differing norms that corporate case law and statutes
impose”); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder, 10
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 31 (2005) (exploring the nexus between shareholder ethical
responsibility and corporate law); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor
Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 174 (2001)
(reviewing “corporate finance literature on institutional investors’ activities in corporate governance
and us[ing] the findings of the empirical literature to inform normative recommendations for the
proxy process”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (suggesting “that we have made at least some intellectual progress
over the intervening decades on the question of the proper role of the corporation”); Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to Do the Right Thing, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 235 (2014)
(arguing that “benefit corporation statutes have the potential to change the accountability structure
within which managers operate”).
148. See Berle, Jr., supra note 145.
149. See e.g., Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship - Creating Shared Value
through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 520 (2017).
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economists.”150 The “Chicago School” philosophy is that management
should focus on and be evaluated based on economic analysis, and that the
corpoarte purpose or goal is to make shareholders as wealthy as possible.
Stout further postulated that this idea simplified the overall agency problem
of large public corporations because corporate performance could be “easily
measured through the single metric of share price.”151
For the last twenty years, corporate governance scholars and
practitioners have been requiring managers of public companies to maximize
shareholder value by putting emphasis on short-term results.152
Policymakers, practitioners, and academics alike hold strong views that
investors’ emphasis on stock market liquidity, which is evidenced by a
growth in high frequency and algorithmic trading activity and short-term
holding periods, encourages a focus on short-term results.153 As a result, they
argue that large public companies are shying away from investing in research
and development, which requires long-term strategic planning (incorporating
potential failures) that can affect the price of the company’s stock price.154
The short-term focus of investors and corporate boards continues to be a
highly contested issue in the corporate governance debate.155
Today, this debate continues with different prominent actors, which are
represented generally by Lucian Bebchuck156 on the one hand, versus Martin
Lipton157 and Ed Rock158 on the other. Rock is currently the Reporter
working on introducing stakeholder elements into the Restatement under the
American Law Institute Council’s Restatement of Corporate Law project.159
Rock’s undertaking is extremely important due to the recent pressure placed

150. STOUT, supra note 93, at 18 .
151. Id. at 18–19.
152. Stout, supra note 92, at 719.
153. See STOUT, supra note 93.
154. See STOUT, supra note 93.
155. For discussion on shareholder value, see MAYER, supra note 100. See also Millstein, supra
note 100 (“[C]orporate boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out
to whom they owe their fiduciary duties. . . . Some activists are using their newfound power to sway
and bully management to focus on the short term, meet the quarterly targets and disgorge cash in
extra dividends or stock buy backs in lieu of investing in long-term growth.”).
156. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 26.
157. Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum & Karessa L. Cain, Thoughts for Boards of Directors
in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020/ (discussing
potential for emergence of stakeholder governance in 2020).
158. See Rock, supra note 121.
159. Laying Down the Law: Edward Rock Will Oversee Drafting of the First ALI Restatement
on Corporate Governance, NYU (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ideas/edwardrock-ALI-corporate-governance-restatement.

148

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:120

on corporate boards and manageres by business leaders, policymakers,
entrepreneurs, and investors to take stakeholder interests into account.160
At the same time, certain scholars are advocating for a “third way.” For
example, an article by Leo Strine and co-authors calls for “[b]ridging the
[c]onceptual [d]ivide” between the shareholder and stakeholder theories.161
Asaf Raz’s purpose-based theory suggests that directors owe their duties
neither to shareholders, nor to stakeholders.162 Instead, their loyalty is to the
corporation as a separate legal person.163 When they act, directors have a
duty to advance the corporation’s purpose.164 That purpose, dictated by state
corporate law,165 is first to act lawfully: by definition, the corporation is
legally required to meet all of its obligations to stakeholders.166 Once it has
done so, the corporation is free to pursue its own profit.167 The corporation
is free to take stakeholders’ interests into account, even beyond their existing
legal rights, to the extent this promotes its success and purpose.168
In order to navigate the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, which
resulted in a global health and financial crisis, there are calls for solidarity,
mandating cooperation between the public, private, and civic sectors.169
Businesses and corporate boards around the globe are asked to step up to the
plate and take healthcare and socio-economic issues into account when
making decisions. But, the question remains whether the board can—or
should, or must—consider the interests of other stakeholders besides
shareholders. The following is an explanation of the stakeholder approach.
A. Understanding the Stakeholder Approach
There is much debate over “the essence of the board’s fiduciary duty,
and particularly the extent to which the board can or should or must consider
the interests of other stakeholders besides shareholders.”170 As noted, since
160. Alon-Beck, supra note 149.
161. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A
Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2002).
162. Asaf Raz, A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law, 65 VILL. L. REV. 523, 523 (2020).
163. Id. at 529.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
166. Raz, supra note 162, at 529–30.
167. Id. at 538. However, shareholders only indirectly enjoy the corporation’s profits. The
corporation has no duty to make a dividend or buyback at any given time, and should usually operate
for the long-term in a manner determined by its fiduciaries. Id.
168. Id. at 553.
169. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 8, at 7.
170. Martin Lipton, Karessa L. Cain & Kathleen C. Iannone, Stakeholder Governance and the
Fiduciary Duties of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 24, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/24/stakeholder-governance-and-the-fiduciary-duties-ofdirectors/ (emphasis omitted).
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the end of the twentieth century,171 legal scholars and economists, such as
Milton Friedman172 and Michael Jensen,173 have been using shareholder
primacy as a corporate governance model,174 which mandates the
management of large public firms to maximize managerial opportunism,
“shareholder (read Wall Street) supremacy,” and short-termism.175 Scholars
who advocate for “shareholder primacy” focus solely on the shareholders as
the “sole residual claimants” and “owners” of the corporations, ignoring all
the other stakeholders.176 They suggest that investors focus on short-term
results due to their emphasis on stock market liquidity.177 In the words of
Lynn Stout, “shareholder value thinking had replaced managerialism as the
dominant business philosophy.”178
These views are now clashing headfront with the calls for management
teams and boards to develop business strategies that will encourage long term
success, taking into account all stakeholders and not merely stockholders.179
171. See Stout, supra note 92, at 711 (“Toward the end of the twentieth century, however,
American public companies began to change. The shift began in academia with the rise of the
Chicago School of free market economists. Influential economic thinkers like Milton Friedman and
Michael Jensen, apparently viewing the public corporation rather like a gigantic sole proprietorship,
argued that the absence of shareholder power in public companies noted by Berle and Means was a
problem to be solved rather than a deliberate legal strategy to achieve asset lock-in.”); see also, e.g.,
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 92.
172. See Friedman, supra note 93; see also STOUT, supra note 93, at 18.
173. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94; see also STOUT, supra note 93.
174. See also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 95, at 440–41.
175. See Greenfield, supra note 23, at 749; see also STOUT, supra note 93, at 712 (maximizing
“shareholder value” means maximizing the increase of share price and dividends. “This assumption
is tantamount to assuming that shareholders act like psychopaths who are indifferent to the
consequences that their investing decisions impose on others.”); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra
note 93.
176. See Stout, supra note 92, at 711, 711 n.87 (“Rather than owning corporations, shareholders
own shares, which are a contract with the corporate entity. Similarly, the corporate entity is its own
residual claimant. While the idea of shareholder ‘ownership’ of the firm might be forgiven as a
convenient and harmless metaphor when describing a company with a controlling shareholder, it is
grossly misleading when applied to a board-controlled company.”) (citation omitted).
177. See STOUT, supra note 93, 693 (“The short-term focus of investors and corporate boards is
currently one of the key issues in the corporate governance debate.”); MAYER, supra note 100;
Millstein, supra note 100. Therefore, it is not surprising that recent empirical research already
shows that even profitable technology companies these days increasingly prefer to stay private as
long as possible in order to avoid the pressures of short-term strategies that result from public
ownership. See Rival Versions of Capitalism, supra note 100.
178. Stout, supra note 92, at 713. Stout also refers to the work of Edward Rock, who stated that
“[m]anagers now largely think and act like shareholders.” Id. (quoting Edward B. Rock, Adapting
to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1988 (2013)).
179. The stakeholder approach theory has four main building blocks: corporate planning,
systems theory, corporate social responsibility, and organizational theory. See also R. Edward
Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management 1–7 (Darden Bus. Sch.
Working Paper No. 01-02, 2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=263511
(“The impetus behind stakeholder management was to try and build a framework that was
responsive to the concerns of managers who were being buffeted by unprecedented levels of
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The stakeholder approach defines “stakeholders” as “any group or individual
who is affected by or can affect the achievement of an organization’s
objectives.”180 There is an ongoing debate between scholars of the traditional
view of fiduciary duty,181 who claim that management is responsible for
protecting the interests of the shareholders,182 and scholars of the stakeholder
approach, who claim that management is responsible for protecting the
interest of all stakeholders.183 It should be noted that there is also a
management stakeholder approach, which is a “strategic management
process” and not merely a strategic planning process.184 The strategic
management process allows management to actively design a new direction
for the firm, which will take into account how the firm can have an effect on
the environment and on society, in addition to how the environment and
society possibly will affect the firm. 185
Even the shareholder primacy guru Michael C. Jensen himself changed
some of his statements and conceded that, “we cannot maximize the longterm value of an organization if we ignore or mistreat any important
constituency.”186 Human capital is a very important constituency because it
is a valuable intangible asset, on which the success and progress of the
company depends. As noted by my co-author, Constance Bagley:
environmental turbulence and change. Traditional strategy frameworks were neither helping
managers develop new strategic directions nor were they helping them understand how to create
new opportunities in the midst of so much change. As Freeman observed ‘[O]ur current theories
are inconsistent with both the quantity and kinds of change that are occurring in the business
environment of the 1980’s. . . . . A new conceptual framework is needed.’ A stakeholder approach
was a response to this challenge.” (citation omitted)).
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595, 595 (1997).
182. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1984)
(“Williamson [1984] used a transaction cost framework to show that shareholders deserved special
consideration over other stakeholders because of ‘asset specificity.’ He argued that a shareholder’s
stake was uniquely tied to the success of the firm and would have no residual value should the firm
fail, unlike, for example, the labor of a worker.”).
183. Freeman & McVea, supra note 179, at 16–17 (“Freeman and Evan [1990] have argued, to
the contrary, that Williamson’s approach to corporate governance can indeed be used to explain all
stakeholders’ relationships. Many other stakeholders have stakes that are, to a degree, firm specific.
Furthermore, shareholders have a more liquid market (the stock market) for exit than most other
stakeholders. Thus, asset specificity alone does not grant a prime responsibility towards
stockholders at the expense of all others.”); see also William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A
Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND
BUSINESS 75 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 5th ed. 1993).
184. Freeman & McVea, supra note 179, at 9 (“Strategic planning focuses on trying to predict
the future environment and then independently developing plans for the firm to exploit its
position.”).
185. Id.
186. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 24 (8th ed. 2016).
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“Especially during difficult times, we consider it particularly important for
the board of directors to focus on ensuring the fair treatment of their
employees, not merely on incentivizing the executives.”187
Nevertheless, one question remains: How are the board of directors or
management going to accomplish these goals? In order to answer this
question, we must turn to the boundaries of fiduciary duties.
V. FIDUCIARY DUTY
“Fiduciary relationships are crucial to any individual in any
society. That is because few individuals are self-sufficient and
fewer, if any, can live alone.”
Tamar Frankel188
It may be possible to “expand” the scope of a director’s existing
fiduciary duties to include the protection of employee interests. However,
this is a suggestion that is open for further analysis and debate in the United
States. As a director has an obligation to act according to “the best interests
of the company,” we can argue that taking employee and stakeholder interests
into account is in the best interest of the company.189
How does one become a fiduciary? In the corporate law context, a
person becomes a fiduciary by serving as a director or officer.190 To whom
does a corporate fiduciary’s duties run? The answer can change depending
on the state or nation in question. According to Velasco, in Delaware, “the
answer is straightforward: it is ultimately to the shareholders alone.”191 In

187. Anat Alon-Beck, Instead of Panicking Over the Coronavirus, Maybe We Should Start
Innovating, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2020, 9:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/02
/28/instead-of-panicking-over-the-coronavirus-maybe-we-should-startinnovating/?sh=85250d77eaf4.
188. Tamar Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law 2 (Boston Univ. Sch. of L., Pub. L. Rsch. Paper
No. 18-18, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3237023.
189. For more on this line of suggestion, see Jennifer G. Hill, Corporate Governance and the
Role of the Employee, in PARTNERSHIP AT WORK: THE CHALLENGE OF EMPLOYEE DEMOCRACY
110 (Paul J. Gollan & Glenn Patmore eds., 2003); see also Fisch & Solomon, supra note 17, at 130.
190. See Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 61 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019). Employees
and other agents of the corporation are also fiduciaries, but that is more properly understood as an
aspect of agency law rather than corporate law. See Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in
Agency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019);
Aditi Bagchi, Fiduciary Principles in Employment Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). In addition, shareholders with a controlling
interest in the corporation may be held to have fiduciary duties.
191. See Velasco, supra note 190; Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“The board of
directors has the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its
shareholder owners.”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Corporate
Fiduciary Law: Searching for the Optimal Balance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY
LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
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other states or nations, it is possible that the fiduciary duty will be extended
more broadly.192
Fiduciary duty regulates relationships in many legal fields193 and has a
long history.194 The duty is imposed upon people or organizations in a
position of trust or confidence in order to deal with agency costs, asymmetric
information, and conflicts of interest when they exercise “discretionary
power in the interests of another person.”195
There is a way to settle the dispute between Dodd and Berle with regard
to directors in the exercise of their fiduciary duties. If we take the Berle view,
which is the dominant view in Delaware, as noted in further detail below, the
directors or managers can be protected under the business judgment rule as
long as their decision was informed, in good faith, and for the best interests
of the company. Therefore, as long as employee interests are in the best
interests of the company, the court will abstain from reviewing the merits of
the decision.
Directors and officers are fiduciaries. As fiduciaries, they are trusted
with managing the firm on behalf of the shareholder (or capital investors). In
this relationship, the recipients of the fiduciary services, the capital investors,
depend on the services provided by the fiduciaries. The relationship between
the fiduciaries and the capital investors (shareholders) is asymmetrical.196
192. See Velasco, supra note 190 (discussing constituency statutes).
193. See Frankel, supra note 188. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Ben Chen, Fiduciary
Principles in Family Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 227 (Evan J. Criddle
et al. eds., 2019); Nina A. Kohn, Fiduciary Principles in Surrogate Decision-Making, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 249 (Evan J Criddle et al. eds., 2019); EVAN J. CRIDDLE
& EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES
AUTHORITY, chs. 1–7 (2016); DeMott, supra note 190; Bagchi, supra note 190; Dana M. Muir,
Fiduciary Principles in Pension Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 167 (Evan
J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019); Emily L. Sherwin, Formal Elements of Contract and Fiduciary Law, in
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 167 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016);
Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29 MELB. U.
L. REV. 478 (2005); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry:
An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L. Rev. 319 (1999); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate
Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647 (2015); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Fiduciary Principles in
Charities and Other Nonprofits (Jan. 30, 2018), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW
(Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
194. See Frankel, supra note 188, at 2 (“It was recognized in Roman law and the British common
law and appeared decades ago in religious laws, such as Jewish law, Christian law, and Islamic law.
Internationally, fiduciary law has a place in European legal system in Chinese law, Japanese law
and Indian law.”) (citations omitted).
195. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME FINANCE INITIATIVE (UNEP FI) &
PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (PRI), FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL
REPORT,
https://www.unepfi.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Fiduciary-duty-21stcentury-final-report.pdf.
196. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94. For further discussion on agency
problems and strategies to reduce them, see also John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
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The shareholders depend on the fiduciaries because they “cannot acquire the
knowledge and expertise necessary for all the services that all fiduciaries can,
and do, offer.”197 In return, they reward fiduciaries for their services.
Fiduciaries acquire power over their investors, as they often have the
discretion to decide how to invest the funds that investors have invested in
the firm.198 In many cases, there is an imbalance in the relationship between
the fiduciary and the beneficiary. The investors lack the ability to exercise
oversight (monitoring) over the beneficiary. They might not possess
expertise to be able to “fully evaluate and judge the value, quality and
reliability of services, and whether it satisfies their needs.”199
Fiduciary duty, therefore, is important to curtail the fiduciary’s power,
so that it is not “abused and misused, intentionally or negligently.”200
Moreover, fiduciary duty requires the directors and officers, “who manage
other people’s money [to] act responsibly in the interests of beneficiaries or
investors, as opposed to serving their own interests.”201
Any decision that is a business decision is protected under the business
judgment rule (“BJR”). The BJR is a common law defense developed by
courts and an important concept to understanding fiduciary duty in corporate
law. The BJR is (and has been for decades) the most important protection
against personal liability for directors and officers.202 It allows directors and
officers in a corporation to take calculated business risks and prevents the
courts from second-guessing such business decisions.203
Delaware courts interpret the BJR as “a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.”204 If a fiduciary makes a decision that will benefit
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier H. Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies,
Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward Rock. eds.,
2d ed. 2009); George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 83 Q. J. ECON. 488, 493 (1970).
197. See Frankel, supra note 188, at 3.
198. See UNEP FI & PRI, supra note 195, at 10 (“In practice, these fiduciaries have discretion as
to how they invest the funds they control. The scope of that discretion varies. It may be narrow,
for example, in the case of tailored mutual funds where the beneficiary specifies the asset profile
and only the day-to-day stock selection and other management tasks are left to the investment
decision maker. It may be wide, as with many occupational pension funds. Further, some public
funds are subject to considerable state control and the discretion afforded to these decision makers
may be further narrowed by parameters set by government.”).
199. See Frankel, supra note 188, at 3.
200. Id.
201. See UNEP FI & PRI, supra note 195, at 10 (“The manner in which these duties are framed
differs between countries and between common and civil law jurisdictions.”) (citation omitted).
202. There is a difference between the Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty.
203. Velasco, supra note 190.
204. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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employees as stakeholders, that decision will contribute to the financial
growth and overall long-term value creation in the company. Accordingly,
such a decision should be considered a business decision protected under the
BJR.
Therefore, in order to prevent abuse by fiduciaries in the United States,
courts should adopt the “all things being equal rule.”205 This rule means that
fiduciaries can and should take employees’ interests into account (as
stakeholders) in such a way as to “generate collateral benefits, but only if
such an investment [is] ‘equal to or superior’ in risk, return, and soundness
to other alternatives.”206
In order to prevent abuse, there is a need for fiduciaries to be transparent
about their business decisions and to implement better corporate reporting on
EESG issues, investment beliefs, long-term mandates, integrated reporting,
and performance.
VII. THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE MONITORING OF PUBLIC MANAGERS
There are several theories that deal with the problem of inadequate
monitoring of public managers, as noted above. The dominant theory is the
agency theory, which deals with the shirking behavior of agents.207 Both the
shareholder and stakeholder theories must deal with the uncertainty
surrounding the potential opportunistic conduct of the managers.208
Investors take information risks—the “adverse selection”
challenge209—into account prior to any engagement with or investment in a
company. The investors of public companies are usually apathetic and have
either a hard time or no desire to acquire information about the portfolio
company and risks. That is why there is always a need for disclosure of
information.

205. UNEP FI & PRI, supra note 195, at 11 (“In the US, for example, the decision maker’s duty
is to exercise reasonable care, skill and caution in pursuing an overall investment strategy that
incorporates risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.”).
206. See Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto & Anne M. Tucker, Institutional
Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 85 (2015); Jayne
Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging Economically Targeted Investments, 5
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 47, 49 (1996) (“The Department of Labor’s position under the direction
of Lanoff became known as the ‘all things being equal’ test.”).
207. See, e.g., Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 75
(1979).
208. See also PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 127–31 (1999);
Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture
Capital Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 54–55 (2002).
209. See Akerlof, supra note 196, at 493 (firms’ offerings of equity may be associated with
“lemons” problem); see also Utset, supra note 208, at 56; GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 208, at
129.
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According to Jensen and Meckling, the agency problem is a common
problem and exists in all enterprises and cooperation forms.210 Therefore, it
is not a unique characteristic of a company that takes shareholders or
stakeholder interests into account.
The analysis of the agency theory assumes that the main problem is to
align the interests of the principal and agent, and to get the agent to follow
the principal’s orders, without taking into account the agent’s interests.
Therefore, adopting a strategic stakeholder approach to management
would not increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders.
Corporate leaders are already insulated, and it is very difficult today to hold
them personally accountable for their actions, unless they clearly violate their
duty of loyalty. That is why we should require managers that want to take
stakeholder interests into account to ask their shareholders to either
incorporate such an obligation in the company’s charter, with a specific
purpose, or to convert the company to a PBC.
In his Article, Making It Easier For Directors To “Do The Right
Thing”?, Justice Strine postulates that the benefit corporation statutes “have
the potential to change the accountability structure within which managers
operate.”211 In theory, if adopted, these statutes can mandate that managers
take stakeholder interests into account and “do the right thing.”212
Unfortunately, however, it seems that this new form is not that popular for
the reasons listed below. As evidenced by the fact that approximately 4,000
companies have adopted this new form in the United States, including wellknown companies such as Patagonia and Kickstarter.213
A. The Public Benefit Corporation
There is a rise in legislation of hybrid corporate forms in the United
States, where legislators in thirty-five states across the country (and the
District of Columbia) have enacted some form of innovative social enterprise
legislation. Legislators have passed forty-five bills, mirroring current social

210. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94, at 309 (“The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to
behave as if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general. It exists in all
organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in firms, in universities,
in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in
relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as are common in the performing arts
and the market for real estate. The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs
take in each of these situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and
why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and
the social sciences generally.”).
211. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 235, 235 (2014).
212. Id.
213. See Alon-Beck, supra note 149, at 523.
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movements.214 “[T]he most common form of social enterprise legislation
adopted is the benefit corporation legislation.”215 Even Delaware, a state that
is considered to be pro-management, due to its court decisions and statutes,216
adopted such a form in 2013—the Public Benefit Corporation (“PBC”).
Unfortunately, many companies find it hard to adopt this form because there
is inadequate guidance in Delaware and other states on how managers and
directors can balance the company’s profit purpose with its public benefit
purpose.217 There is also uncertainty in the event of litigation over breach of
fiduciary duties.
In my article, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship - Creating Shared
Value through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics, I note that social
214. See Alon-Beck, supra note 149, at 523 n.7 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 10-2401–22; ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-36-101–401; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–31 (2013); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–
3503; COL. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501–11, 6-113-102; S.B. 23, 2014 SESS.; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT.
8, §§ 361–68; D.C. CODE §§ 29-1301.01–1304.01; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.601–13; FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 607.501–13; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-1–13; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-01–13; 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1–5.01; 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-5, 1-10(A)(1), 1-26, 15-5; H.B.
1015, 119th GEN. ASSEMB., 2015 SESS.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1801–32; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12:1301(A)(11.1), 1302(C), 1305(B)(3), 1306(A)(1), 1309(A); ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 31,
§§ 1502, 1508, 1559, 1611; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01–08; MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 11-4A-1201–08, 11-1-502, 5-6C-03; MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 156E, §§ 1–16;
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450.4102, 4204(2), 4803(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 304A.001–301; H.B.
258, 64th LEG. SESS.; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-401–14; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78B.010–190; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 293-C:1–13; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1–11; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§
1701–09; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 60.750–70; 15 PENN. CONS. STAT. §§ 3301–05; R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 7-5.3-1–13; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-2, 9, 49, 76; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-38-110–600;
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101–402; UTAH CODE §§ 16-10B-101–402; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 482C-102, 403, 405, 412, 1411; VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11A §§ 21.01–14; VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11, §§
3001(27), 3005(A), 3023(A); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782–91; REV. CODE WASH. 23B.25.005–
150; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31F-1-101–501; WY. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-102(A)(IX), 108, 705).
215. See id. at 524. The benefit corporation (“BC”) model is the most common form that was
adopted by states (it is also called sustainable business corporation (“HI”), benefit company
(“OR”)). See SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/map (last visited
Aug. 3, 2017) (providing a status tool that shows the various states and D.C. that enacted the benefit
corporation legislation). The other forms are the social purpose corporation (“SPC”), the public
benefit corporation (“PBC), the general benefit corporation (“GBC”), the specific benefit
corporation (“SBC”), the low-profit limited liability company (“L3C”), and the benefit limited
liability company (“BLLC”). Id.; see also Ana Vinueza & Kristin Hiensch, Social Enterprise
Legislation in the United States: An Overview, MORRISTON FOERSTER (Sept. 20, 2016),
http://impact.mofo.com/resources/social-enterprise-legislation-in-the-united-states-an-overview/.
216. See BAGLEY, supra note 186, at 638.
217. Jen Barnette, Delaware Public Benefit Corporation – Is It Right for You? A Five-Part Test,
COOLEYGO.COM, https://www.cooleygo.com/delaware-public-benefit-corporation-is-it-right-foryou-a-five-part-test/ (last visited June 30, 2020) (“One of the main differences between a traditional
Delaware corporation and the PBC relates to the director’s fiduciary duties. Whereas under
Delaware law, directors of traditional corporations must manage the corporation in the best interests
of the stockholders, the PBC requires directors to balance the interests of stockholders, the public
benefit purpose and the interests of those materially affected by the PBC’s conduct. It’s good news
that there have been no lawsuits relating to a PBC’s fiduciary duties but this lack of precedent leaves
little guidance on how directors are to balance these potentially competing interests.”).
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entrepreneurs are dealing with legal uncertainty and capital formation
difficulties.218 They have to “persuad[e] their potential investors and other
audiences that they are indeed credible and are leading a social enterprise as
they claim, which result in inefficiencies in raising capital. There are
additional challenges associated with structuring, launching, funding, and
counseling social enterprises,” which are also discussed in detail in that
article. 219
Until we develop agreed-upon metrics for assessment, there will always
be difficulty associated with measuring value creation and intangible assets
of public benefit corporations. There is debate on whether these firms can
simply be measured by monetary performance or traditional profit creation.
Instead, they “should be evaluated based on their impact on the public, the
communities that they serve, the services that they offer, and the various
products that they create.”220
Moreover, some will claim that the management of PBCs “cannot
capture the full social value that was created in an economic form [to] justify
spending or paying” for the resources used by the firm, even when
“improvements can be measured and attributed to a given intervention.”221
That is why social entrepreneurship scholars like Gregory Dees suggest that
social entrepreneurs should not be concerned with wealth creation, but rather
with mission-related impact, as “[w]ealth is just a means to an end for social
entrepreneurs.”222 The question is whether markets have difficulty with
evaluating social value creation, improvement, and overall public goods.
Dees claims that markets have difficulty determining whether the resources
that are used by the social entrepreneur in order to create value actually
generate sufficient social value to justify their use.223 Edmans also finds that
equity markets fail to fully incorporate the value of intangible assets, but also
that employee satisfaction improves overall firm performance.224
To illustrate, note that Edmans used the list of the “100 Best Companies
to Work For in America” to measure employee satisfaction, and collected
data that was available since 1984.225 He also looked at the future stock
218. See Alon-Beck, supra note 149 at 535.
219. Id. at 564–65.
220. Id. at 566.
221. Id. at 567.
222. J. Gregory Dees, The Meaning of “Social Entrepreneurship”, DUKE UNIV. INNOVATION
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2–3 (last updated May 30, 2001), https://centers.fuqua.duke.edu/case/wpcontent/uploads/sites/7/2015/03/Article_Dees_MeaningofSocialEntrepreneurship_2001.pdf.
223. Id. at 3.
224. Edmans finds that employee satisfaction is valuable to firm value while “not immediately
capitalized by the market because it is intangible.” Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully
Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621, 629 (2011).
225. Id. at 621.
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returns of these companies in order to measure the financial performance.226
Edmans found that a “value-weighted portfolio of the ‘100 Best Companies
to Work For in America’ earned an annual four-factor alpha of 3.5% from
1984 to 2009, and 2.1% above industry benchmarks.”227 Therefore, investors
should want management to invest in employees and to make sure that the
employees are satisfied for engagement, retention, and recruitment purposes.
Below are some suggestions that this Article makes about disclosure of this
information to investors and the public.
Perhaps, now that we have these great results, we will see a surge in
traditional public companies that decide to take stakeholder interests into
account and convert to PBCs. As noted above, management should be
required to disclose a specific purpose if they decide to take stakeholder
interests into account or convert into a PBC (especially if there is a potential
conflict of interest). The following are some examples of established
companies that already decided to convert to PBCs despite the many
challenges associated with such a decision.
Companies that have successfully converted their status range from
fashion, technology,228 news,229 and banks,230 to crowdfunding platforms.
For example, Patagonia, a clothing company, was among the first established
companies that converted to a benefit corporation as soon as the benefit
corporation legislation was available in California.231 Kickstarter, the
crowdfunding platform, is also a great example of a Delaware PBC.232
Perhaps more tech companies will decide to incorporate as a PBC before
they do an IPO. Recently, Lemonade Inc., a technology-driven renters’ and

226. Id. at 624.
227. Id. at 621.
228. CiviCore changed from an LLC to a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation in January 2017.
CiviCore Becomes a Public Benefit Corporation, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 17, 2017, 7:40 AM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/civicore-becomes-a-public-benefit-corporation300391285.html.
229. Philadelphia Media Network (news outlet) changed to a Delaware Public Benefit
Corporation in January 2016. Elizabeth K. Babson & Robert T. Esposito, The Year in Social
Enterprise: 2016 Legislative and Policy Review, FAEGRE DRINKER (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2017/2/the-year-in-social-enterprise2016-legislative-and-policy-review.
230. Virginia Community Capital (community-based bank) changed to a Virginia Benefit
Corporation in April 2016. Rick Alexander, VCC: America’s First Benefit Corporation Bank, VA.
CMTY. CAP. (Apr. 3, 2016), https://www.vacommunitycapital.org/news/2016/04/03/vcc-americasfirst-benefit-corporation-bank/.
231. See Matt McDermott, Patagonia Becomes a California Benefit Corporation, MSAYLA (Jan.
3, 2012), https://msayla.com/patagonia-becomes-a-california-benefit-corporation/.
232. Yancey Strickler, Perry Chen & Charles Adler, Kickstarter is Now a Benefit Corporation,
KICKSTARTER BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-now-abenefit-corporation.
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homeowners’ insurance startup, was the second PBC to file for an IPO.233
Lemonade Inc. is incorporated in Delaware, and according to its prospectus,
is committed for the long-term to “make insurance a public good.”234 Perhaps
if things go well for Lemonade Inc., other startups will follow.
Another development is with regard to new legislation that was recently
passed by the Delaware House of Representatives. This new legislation, if
signed into law, will make it easier for a traditional for-profit C-corporation
to convert to a PBC by eliminating the current 2/3 voting requirements for a
corporation to amend its certificate of incorporation or merge with another
entity to become a PBC.235
The following are suggestions with regard to managing human capital,
pertaining to public disclosures and agreed-upon metrics for assessments.
VIII. INFORMATION IS POWER
“There is … one regulatory sphere that requires a holistic set of
disclosures for public consumption: the federal securities laws.”
Ann M. Lipton236
There is a paradigm shift in the U.S. investment community with regard
to the desire to understand the management of human capital. Transparency
with regard to human capital management is incredibly important for
business and society—so much so that our regulators, the SEC, are now
tasked with proposing, drafting, and enforcing new disclosure rules.
On August 8, 2019, the SEC proposed amendments, pursuant to
Regulation S-K, “to modernize the description of business (Item 101), legal
proceedings (Item 103), and risk factor disclosures (Item 105) that registrants
are required to make . . . .”237 Section 108 of the Jumpstart Our Business

233. Cydney Posner, Will There Be a Renewed Interest in IPOs of Public Benefit Corporations?,
COOLEY PUBCO (June 22, 2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/06/22/ipos-public-benefitcorporations/.
234. See id.
235. Some commentators noted that “the Delaware legislature made it particularly difficult to
convert a traditional corporation to a PBC.” Id. Note that, originally, the vote required for
conversion was 90%, which made it well-nigh impossible for a traditional public company to
convert to a PBC. Id.
236. Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder
Disclosure, 37 YALE. J. REG. 499, 507 (2020).
237. ’Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes to Modernize Disclosures of Business, Legal
Proceedings,
and
Risk
Factors
Under
Regulation
S-K
(Aug.
8,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-148; Sanjay M. Shirodkar & Deborah R. Meshulam,
SEC Proposes to Modernize Certain Rules: Transitioning from a Prescriptive to a Principles-Based
Approach?,
DLA
PIPER
(Sept.
10,
2019),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2019/09/sec-proposes-to-modernize-certainrules/.
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Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”) mandates that the SEC’s staff review the
disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K and issue a report.238
Prior to and following the announcement by the SEC, investor groups
have filed comment letters asking the SEC to establish mandatory disclosure
rules on how public companies manage their human capital, which would be
both prescriptive and principles-based. 239 The SEC decided against a
prescriptive disclosure approach and chose to require a principle-based
approach, which allows “companies to decide for themselves whether their
human capital is important enough to their business to warrant disclosure.”240
Unfortunately, as a result of this choice, in practice, public companies will
probably not provide much insight into how they manage their talent.
In the new economy, which is a “knowledgeable economy,”241
employees are incredibly important to the firm, as their knowledge
contributes to the firm’s intangible assets.242 Tech companies especially rely
on their human capital to grow and innovate. Advocacy groups including
Workforce Disclosure Initiative (“WDI”), The Human Capital Management
Coalition (“HCMC”), The CFA Institute, JUST Capital, and others
commented that the SEC should use its mandate and require companies to
disclose more information to their investors and the public on human capital
management.243 The following are requests for changes to disclosure rules.
WDI244 is a project managed by ShareAction,245 which is supported by
a signatory group of 138 investor signatories with over $14 trillion in assets
under management. WDI calls for greater transparency on workforce

238. See Press Release, SEC, supra note 237.
239. Soyoung Ho, Investor Groups: SEC Should Write Prescriptive ‘Human Capital’ Disclosure
Rule,
THOMSON
REUTERS
TAX
&
ACCOUNTING
(Jan.
3,
2020),
https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/investor-groups-sec-should-write-prescriptive-humancapital-disclosure-rule/.
240. Soyoung Ho, Investor Groups: SEC Should Write Prescriptive ‘Human Capital’ Disclosure
Rule,
THOMSON
REUTERS
TAX
&
ACCOUNTING
(Jan.
3,
2020),
https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/investor-groups-sec-should-write-prescriptive-humancapital-disclosure-rule/.
241. UNGER, supra note 6.
242. For example, the intangible assets can take the form of a patent, a trade secret, or a list of
customers. See also JAMES V. DELONG, THE STOCK OPTIONS CONTROVERSY AND THE NEW
ECONOMY 7 (2002), https://www.cei.org/pdf/3055.pdf (“Much of the capital value of the company
may reside in the brains of the workers, not in identifiable physical capital.”).
243. Ho, supra note 240.
244. SHAREACTION, https://shareaction.org/wdi/ (“The WDI is part funded by the Department
for International Development (DFID) and our dedicated investor signatories. In addition, a range
of civil society and private sector organisations are helping to shape the WDI. The initiative is also
endorsed by the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA).”) (last visited Dec. 12, 2020).
245. ShareAction is a UK-based responsible investment NGO. See id.
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policies and practices in companies’ direct operations and supply chains.246
In a comment letter to the SEC, WDI stated:
[W]e express concern about the principles-based approach which
would allow companies significant flexibility in the information
they select for disclosure. We also raise concerns over the use of
a subjective materiality threshold for determining disclosure since
the Commission already requires registrants to report material
information. Removing the rules based [sic] approach could have
the effect of reducing the amount of information that is disclosed
and available to investors. Given the opportunity, many companies
continue to exclude certain material human capital topics from
their public disclosure such as the number of employees and
turnover. It is therefore problematic to rely on a registrant’s
management to evaluate the significance of this information given
the current poor state of disclosure on human capital topics.247
HCMC is a “cooperative effort among a diverse group of influential
institutional investors to further elevate human capital management as a
critical component in company performance . . . . The HCMC is led by the
UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust and includes 30 institutional investors
representing over $5.9 trillion in assets.”248 In a comment letter to the SEC,
HCMC stated:
[P]erformance on certain human capital metrics are material to
investors across all companies. Materiality is defined by reference
to what a reasonable shareholder would consider important in
deciding how to invest or vote. A broad range of investors have
identified certain human capital-related information as likely to
influence their decision making [sic], and a substantial majority of
the comments submitted on the Petition supported some degree of
standardized, comparable disclosures across all companies. The
HCMC believes that consistency and comparability in reporting
promotes efficiency both for issuers who would have concrete
guidance on what to report and how, and for investors who would
no longer need to pore through reams of documents to find basic
information on the workforce. It allows investors to easily and
efficiently compare companies and benchmark performance. It
also levels the playing field between large institutional investors
who can demand (and afford) more data from companies on human

246. SHAREACTION, supra note 244.
247. Letter from Martin Buttle, Head of Good Work, ShareAction, to Vanessa A. Countryman,
Sec’y, ’SEC (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6577976201111.pdf.
248. Human Capital Management Coalition, UAW RETIREE MED. BENEFITS TR.,
http://www.uawtrust.org/hcmc (last visited July 1, 2020).
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capital, and smaller retail investors who, on a practical basis, often
cannot.249
The Center for American Progress further advocates for changes to our
accounting rules, as follows:
Companies’ expenditures on worker training and skills show up
not as a valuable investment similar to R&D but as an increase in
general overhead, a measure that managers have shown a proclivity
for cutting and whose reduction is often cheered by investors. This
treatment of human capital ignores the findings of numerous
studies: Investments in human capital enhance productivity and are
more valuable to a firm than general overhead expenses.250
Leo Strine, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, has
joined these calls for greater recognition of human capital investments.251
Strine offers several great proposals, including new accounting rules that will
treat corporate investments in the workforce as capital expenditures.252 Strine
also calls on public companies to set up board committees that will be focused
on the welfare of the workforce.253 Strine’s suggestions are all welcome.
Former SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson and current SEC
Commissioner Allison Lee also expressed their concerns about the shift to a
principles-based disclosure approach, in a published joint statement. They
stated:
One concern with principles-based disclosure is that it gives
company executives discretion over what they tell investors.
Another is that it can produce inconsistent information that
investors cannot easily compare, making investment analysis—
and, thus, capital—more expensive. Our concern is that the
proposal’s principles-based approach will fail to give American
investors the information they need about the companies they
own.254
This Article joins the call for change. By selecting a principles-based
disclosure regime, the SEC failed to take meaningful steps to improve access
for investors and employees to information regarding human capital
management, efforts, and results. The SEC should move to a prescriptive
249. Letter from Cambria Allen-Ratzlaff, Chair, Human Capital Management Coalition, to
Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1119/s71119-6322887-194462.pdf (citation omitted).
250. Hanks et al., supra note 2, at 1.
251. Strine, Jr., supra note 1.
252. Id. at 7.
253. Id. at 2.
254. Liz Dunshee, S-K Modernization: Two SEC Commissioners Concerned About “PrinciplesBased”
Proposal,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET
(Aug.
28,
2019),
https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/2019/08/s-k-modernization-two-sec-commissionersconcerned-about-principles-based-proposal.html.
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approach (a specific line-item requirement) and require public companies to
disclose information on various topics, including the following: (1)
workforce composition (including workforce demographics255 on hiring,
promotion, compensation and incentives,256 layoffs, furloughs, other
employment policies and practices) broken down by major job categories; (2)
information with regard to layoffs and furloughs (additional information on
demographics of employees, such as rehires, training, healthcare and other
benefits); (3) information on training, skill building, and capabilities;257 and
(4) information on healthcare coverage and best practices to ensure employee
health, safety, and well-being during the pandemic.
Disclosures will help investors understand how management makes
decisions on human capital and culture. Management should disclose the
metrics that they use in order to make hiring, retention, training, and firing
decisions. Disclosures will also help talent—the employees—bargain with
the firm. Currently, the reality is that employees do not have formal
representation in the governance of the firm and do not possess sufficient
information on the practices of their employers to negotiate their contracts
with the firm.258 Lack of representation and lack of access to information
contribute to the systemic problem of lack of diversity amongst the largest
employers in our nation.
As noted above, although both labor and capital contribute to the firm,
only capital gets to decide on how the firm is to be governed. Now, even
capital investors demand to have information on human capital management
of public firms.259 Now, more than ever, management and directors need to
step up, disclose information on their employment practices, take care of their
employees, make sure that their interests are represented in governance
255. According to the HCMC proposal, demographics information should include the following
categories: “number of full-time, part-time, contingent, subcontracted and outsourced workers.”
Doreen Lilienfeld & Max Bradley, Human Capital Management Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 20, 2020) (citing Letter from Hum. Cap. Mgmt. Coal. to William
Hinman, Dir., SEC Division of Corporation Finance (July 6, 2017)),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/20/human-capital-management-disclosure/#11).
256. According to the HCMC proposal, information on compensation and incentives should
include “bonus metrics [and] measures to counterbalance risks created by incentives.” Id.
257. According to the HCMC proposal, information on skills should include the following
categories: “training, alignment with business strategy, skill gaps.” Id.
258. See, e.g., Jamillah Bowman Williams, Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685,
1687 (2019); see generally David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of
Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2017) (describing FOIA’s procedural obstacles).
259. David McCann, Investors to SEC: Mandate People Disclosures, CFO (July 20, 2017),
https://www.cfo.com/people/2017/07/investors-to-sec-mandate-people-disclosures-humancapital/; Hope Spencer & Kelly Simoneaux, Public Company Alert: Are You Ready for the New
Human Capital Management Disclosure?, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/public-company-alert-are-you-ready-new-human-capitalmanagement-disclosure.
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decisions, and “integrat[e] human capital considerations into the overarching
strategy to create long-term value.”260 As noted in my Forbes op-ed article
with Constance E. Bagley: “Once the COVID pandemic is contained and
firms go back to fighting to attract and keep the best workers, individuals will
remember (and easily share on social media) which firms lent a hand and
which only took care of the folks at the top.”261
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article also joins the call for a return to a basic “managerialism”
philosophy.262
Managers of public corporations nowadays cannot
realistically claim that they are pursuing long-term projects, such as taking
employee interests into account, without disclosing information on these
issues to investors and the public. Therefore, the current disclosure regime
must change to a prescriptive-based disclosure regime, which will improve
access to information. The move to a prescriptive approach will compel
directors (or management) to seriously take into account the interests of their
employees and not simply use a public statement as a PR move.
There is a need for bright-line rules, such as agreed-upon metrics for
assessment, or a requirement that all public companies disclose the same type
of information with regard to investment in human capital and culture. We
cannot leave it up to management to determine whether disclosure on human
capital is required and under which circumstances.
Human capital disclosure requirements would encourage managers and
directors to take employee interests into account. This suggestion would
grow the economy, encourage innovation, and benefit the firm, its
shareholders, and its stakeholders. Nevertheless, it has limitations.
There is no one-model-fits-all format. It should be recognized that
managers (or directors) can run into problems given geopolitical realities, as
well as developments at the local, state, federal, and international levels,
which can confound these relations..
Also, legal scholars will continue to rewrite, reinterpret, and think about
the stakeholder versus shareholder models, and the purpose of the
corporation. However, using this modest suggestion and its variants would
develop into a new high-bar standard for expanding strategic and sustained
economic growth of the companies involved, by encouraging innovation and
development for generations to come.
260. Klemash, Lee & Smith, supra note 33.
261. Anat Alon-Beck, Stakeholder Capitalism: Should Employees Demand Change?, FORBES
(June 11, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/06/11/stakeholder-capitalismshould-employees-demand-change/#69b05f193b7d.
262. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return
of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2013).
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In the meanwhile, the SEC can and should intervene in the market and
alleviate the lack of mandatory reporting and access to information, which
also contribute to the systemic problem of lack of diversity amongst the
largest employers in our nation. Our securities laws can require public
companies to disclose information relating to their human capital practices
as suggested above. Furthermore, such reports must be made mandatory and
not left to the discretion of the companies.

